

RESEARCH ON INDICATORS OF FORCED LABOR

in the Supply Chains of
Brazil-Nuts, Cattle, Corn,
and Peanuts in Bolivia



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Abbreviations and Glossary

Abbreviations

APG - Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (Assembly of Guaraní People)

CADEXNOR - Cámara de Exportadores del Norte (Chamber of Northern Exporters)

CCCH - Consejo de Capitanes de Chuquisaca (Chuquisaca Captains' Council)

CIDOB - Central Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Indigenous Center of Eastern Bolivia)

CIRABO - Central Indígena de la Amazonía Boliviana Indígena (Center of the Bolivian Amazon)

COB - Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers' Central)

CSUTCB - Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia)

ILO – International Labor Organization

INE – Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Statistics Institute)

INRA – Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Institute)

OEA - Organization of American States

PROMASOR - Asociación de Productores de Maíz y Sorgo (Association of Corn and Sorghum Producers)

UDAPE – Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (Unit for Social and Economic Policies)

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

IACHR - Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Glossary

Aguinaldo: Christmas Bonus

Barracas: Areas where Brazil-nut harvesters live

Barraqueros: Brazil-nut concessionaires

Barriadas: Rustic housing that Brazil-nut factory workers generally build and live in

Barricas: Wooden boxes used to measure the amount of Brazil-nuts harvested.

Campesinos: Peasants

Chaqueo: A type of slash and burn agriculture

Criollos: Direct descendants of Spanish and other European immigrants.

Guaraní: Indigenous group prominent in the Chaco region

Habilito: Working capital provided to workers in the form of food, supplies, and tools

Haciendas: Ranches on which cattle, corn, and peanuts are produced

Mestizos: Descendants of both criollos and indigenous Bolivians.

Parceleros: Workers who inherited parcels of land from haciendas where they worked

Payoles: rustic huts and silos where Brazil-nuts are temporarily stored

Quebradores/as: Brazil-nut pod breakers or peelers, usually women

Quechua: Indigenous group prevalent in the Amazon and Chaco regions

Rescatadores: Intermediaries who provide workers with the habilito

Sindicatos: Community collectives (not to be confused with unions)

Tierra de comunidad: Communal lands

Weenhayek: Indigenous group that lives in the Chaco region

Introduction

Verité carried out research on the presence of indicators to forced labor in the production of goods in seven countries from 2009 through 2011. Research was carried out on the production of shrimp in Bangladesh; Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and peanuts in Bolivia; sugar in the Dominican Republic; coffee in Guatemala; fish in Indonesia; rubber in Liberia; and tuna in the Philippines. The following report is based on research on the presence of indicators of forced labor in the production of Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region of Bolivia and the production of cattle, corn, and peanuts in the Chaco region of

Bolivia. This research was not intended to determine the existence or scale of forced labor in the regions and sectors under study, but rather to identify the presence of indicators of forced labor and factors that increased workers' vulnerability to labor exploitation.

Objectives

The primary objectives of the project were to:

- obtain background information on Bolivia and the Amazon and Chaco regions (place, people, product, policies and programs);
- create a methodology to study the presence of indicators of forced labor in production of Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region and cattle, corn, and peanut in the Chaco region;
- identify and document indicators of forced labor among workers in the Brazil-nut sector in the Amazon region and cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Chaco region;
- document the broader working and living conditions that Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sector workers experience in the Amazon and Chaco regions; and
- determine the risk factors for vulnerability to forced labor and other forms of exploitation in the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Amazon and Chaco regions.

Context

In order to gain an understanding of the social, economic, labor market, and cultural context of Bolivia, background research was carried out through a comprehensive literature and legal review and expert consultations. Bolivia is a country with a relatively high level of economic growth, which has failed to reach a large portion of the population. While Bolivia is the largest Brazil-nut exporter in the world, the vast majority of cattle, corn, and peanuts produced are for local consumption. Past research has found indicators of forced labor in Brazil-nut production in the Amazon region and in cattle, corn, and peanut production on *haciendas* in the Chaco region. The government has been active in combating forced labor, but has a limited capacity, especially in isolated areas, and problems remain in the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Amazon and Chaco regions.

Research Methodology and Limitations

Research in Bolivia was supervised by Verité's Latin America Coordinator and was managed by a Bolivian Research Coordinator. The research team also included a lawyer, four anthropologists, a psychologist, two linguistic experts, and bilingual local worker interviewers who spoke Spanish and indigenous languages.

Verité developed a mixed-methods research methodology to research indicators of forced labor in Brazil-nut production in the Bolivian Amazon region and cattle, corn, and peanut production in Bolivia's Chaco region. Verité carried out both qualitative and quantitative research, including literature review, expert consultations, a supply chain mapping, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, in-depth interviews, and a quantitative survey. Respondents were selected through non-probability sampling using convenience and snowball sampling techniques.

Field research on Brazil-nuts began in the Amazon region in November 2009 with a rapid appraisal.¹ This was followed by a quantitative survey administered to returned workers in their home communities in April and May of 2010. Over 300 worker interviews resulted in 273 valid surveys for the Brazil-nuts study.

Field research on cattle, corn, and peanuts began in the Chaco region in October 2010. In-depth qualitative field research was carried out in the Chaco region from April to June 2011. This was complemented by a quantitative survey carried out from May to September 2011. In total, over 750 worker interviews resulted in 601 valid surveys. Many workers interviewed worked in the production of more than one good. Therefore, 537 corn producers, 278 peanut producers, and 233 cattle producers were surveyed.

Challenges faced by the researchers included torrential rains and flooding, protests and road blocks, a serious car accident that resulted in the hospitalization of the researchers, and a violent assault of the Research Coordinator, which resulted in his hospitalization and a number of surgical interventions.

Since this study is not statistically representative at the national or sectoral level, findings should not be generalized to the entire population. The study of Brazil-nuts was only focused on the Amazon region and the study of cattle, corn, and peanuts was only focused on the Chaco region, so the findings cannot be applied to other geographical areas. Nevertheless, researchers were able to obtain valuable, detailed information about the production of Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and peanuts, and the indicators of forced labor that are present in the production of these goods.

Main Findings

Verité investigated the presence of indicators of forced labor using International Labor Organization (ILO) guidance titled, "Identifying Forced Labor in Practice", which was published by the Special Action Program on Forced Labor in a 2005 report, *A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work*.

Research on Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region detected evidence of the presence of the following indicators of lack of consent: physical confinement in the work location, psychological compulsion (i.e. an order to work, backed up by a penalty for noncompliance), induced indebtedness, deception or false promises about terms of

work, withholding and non-payment of wages, and retention of identity documents. Research detected evidence of the presence of the following indicators of menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of): physical violence against workers, sexual violence, supernatural retaliation, physical confinement, dismissal from work, exclusion from future employment, exclusion from community and social life, removal of rights and privileges, deprivation of food, shift to even worse working conditions, and loss of social status. Other issues of concern detected during research included excessive working hours, a lack of days off during peak periods, low wages, a lack of benefits, serious hazards to workers' health and safety, discrimination, poor living conditions, dangerous transportation, and child labor. Research detected risk factors that increased workers' vulnerability to forced labor amongst Brazil-nut harvesters and factory workers in the Amazon region.

Research on cattle, corn, and peanuts in the Chaco region detected evidence of the presence of the following indicators of lack of consent: physical confinement in the work location, psychological compulsion, induced indebtedness, deception or false promises about terms of work, and withholding and non-payment of wages. Research detected evidence of the presence of the following indicators of menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of): physical violence against workers, sexual violence, and loss of social status. Other issues of concern detected during research included excessive working hours, a lack of days off for workers in animal husbandry, subminimum wages, serious hazards to workers' health and safety, and child labor. Risk factors that increased workers' vulnerability to forced labor were detected amongst salaried workers and indigenous and peasant self-employed workers in the cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Chaco region.

Background & Setting

Places

Bolivia comprises 1,098,581 square kilometers. Its population in 2012 was estimated at 10,088,100 inhabitants. Sixty-seven percent of the population was urban and 33 percent was rural.²

In 2011, the gross domestic product of Bolivia was estimated at USD 51.41 billion, representing the 92nd biggest economy in the world. In 2011, GDP per capita amounted to USD 4,800. Estimates from 2010 indicate that the agricultural sector comprised 12 percent of GDP, industry comprised 38 percent, and the service sector comprised 50 percent.³ According to a 2009 report, the projected growth of Bolivia's GDP in 2009 was the highest in the Western hemisphere.⁴ While the economy of Bolivia is growing, the benefits are not necessarily reaching all Bolivians, especially those who survive through subsistence agriculture, and increasing numbers of Bolivian workers are finding themselves living in poverty.⁵

The Bolivian economy is heavily dependent on informal, small scale enterprises and a subsistence economy. Sixty-eight percent of the economically active population in Bolivia was involved in informal economic activities in 2005, while ten percent of businesses in Bolivia generated 65 percent of the country's wealth in 2005.⁶ In 2012, the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Index ranked Bolivia at 108 of 182 countries (up from 113 in 2007). In 2012, 14 percent of the population was judged to be living on less than USD 1.25 per day. Using the GINI coefficient, a measurement of the level of equality (with a score of zero meaning complete equality and 100 meaning total inequality), Bolivia received a score of 57.3.⁷

The Amazon Region

Geographically, the Amazon region of Bolivia comprises 70,000 square kilometers in the department of Pando, in the Vaca Diez province of Beni and in northern Iturrealde province in the department of La Paz. The Amazon Region includes the entire department of Pando, which had a surface area of 63,827 square kilometers and an estimated population of 83,982 in 2011. In 2010, the gross revenue for Pando was close to BOB 313,150,000 (USD 98.8 million).

According to the Bolivian government's National Statistics Institute (INE) and Unit for Social and Economic Policies (UDAPE), 72.4 percent of Pando's population lived in poverty, 91.5 percent of whom lived in rural areas.⁸ The urban population is concentrated in the Nicolás Suárez province, containing the capital city of Cobija. In Manuripi, Madre de Dios, Abuna and Federico Román provinces, the percentage of the population living under the poverty line exceeded 92 percent. In Madre de Dios, the percentage of the population living under the poverty line reached 98.5 percent, of which 33.9 percent were moderately poor and 66.9 percent were in extreme poverty; while in Federico Román, 96.8 percent of the population was living under the poverty line, with 58.4 percent living in extreme poverty.⁹

The Chaco Region

The Gran Chaco is comprised of about 1,100,000 square kilometers, 50 percent of which is located in Argentina, 35 percent in Paraguay, and 15 percent in Bolivia.¹⁰ The Bolivian region of Chaco is located between Rio Grande, Santa Cruz and Rio Bermejo, Tarija, comprising 127,755 square kilometers (11.6 percent of Bolivian territory). It comprises three departments (Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija), five provinces, and sixteen municipalities. The Incahuasi mountain range divides the Chaco region in two zones with strong differences in terms of social and political organization. The only land apt for agriculture is found at the foothills of the Eastern Andean Mountains in the three main valleys of Huacareta, Monteagudo, and Muyupampa.

People

Bolivia has the largest percentage of indigenous inhabitants in the world. Close to 62 percent of the Bolivian population identified themselves as indigenous in the 2002 census.¹¹ There are 34 indigenous groups in Bolivia, each with their own languages or dialects, traditions, religious practices, systems of social and political organization, and subsistence economies. Aymaras represent 25 percent of the total population; Quechuas comprise 30 percent; 38 percent of the population is Hispanic; and the other seven percent is distributed amongst the 32 other indigenous groups.¹²

Despite having been subjected to conditions of servitude and slavery, as well as severe social discrimination and exclusion, the indigenous groups scattered throughout Bolivia have become increasingly empowered and politically active. It was this democratic civil consciousness that fostered the election of Evo Morales, the first indigenous President elected anywhere in the world. They are now in the process of obtaining increased social inclusion through what are known in Bolivia as “Social Organizations” (*Organizaciones Sociales*). Social Organizations have already succeeded in changing the Political Constitution of the State.

There is also a migrant peasant culture with Aymara-Quechua roots. Their members are indigenous migrants from the Andean highlands who migrated into the lowlands as colonists. The groups are communitarian in nature, and are governed by agrarian *sindicatos* (community collectives). These *sindicatos* are not unions (as their Spanish name may suggest), although they do organize and represent self-employed workers. They use the term *sindicato* due to their affiliation with the Bolivian Workers' Central (*Central Obrera Boliviana* -COB) a labor confederation originally for industrial workers, but which has also welcomed self-employed workers such as peasant farmers. Some are also affiliated with the Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (*Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* – CSUTCB), the strongest indigenous and *mestizo* organization in the country. Peasant workers retain traditions from their places of origin, including dividing their land into two parts: one part for private use and the other for collective use, known as *tierra de comunidad*. Their culture is Andean but strongly influenced by *mestizo* and *criollo* culture. Almost the entire population is bilingual, learning their native language at home and Spanish in school.

The third cultural group is the *criollo-mestizo* group. The *criollos* are the “pure blood” descendants of Spanish and other European immigrants who are very few in number. Due to mixing between *criollos* and indigenous Bolivians, *mestizos* emerged, with various gradations of mixture. This culture is stratified into a relatively small and predominantly light-skinned group that makes up the landed oligarchy, a large group of commercial and service sector workers, and another large group of blue collar and agricultural workers.

The Amazon Region

There are three primary groups in the Amazon. Indigenous peoples, peasant migrants, and *criollos/mestizos*. There are a number of indigenous groups in the Amazon region, including:

- the Araona group, with 112 residents in La Paz Department;¹³
- the Cavineño group, with 1,677 inhabitants in Beni and Pando;¹⁴
- the Chácobo Group, with 501 inhabitants in Beni;¹⁵
- the Esse Ejjas group, with 939 inhabitants in Pando and La Paz;¹⁶
- the Machineri group, with 155 nomadic inhabitants in Pando;
- the Nahua group, with an undetermined nomadic population in Pando;¹⁷
- the Toromona group, with no currently identifiable population, in La Paz;¹⁸ and
- the Pacahuara group, with 25 inhabitants in Beni and Pando.¹⁹

These groups form the indigenous culture of the Bolivian Amazon. Each group has its own language, but for meetings or assemblies with other groups, they use Spanish. Amazonian indigenous workers have organized through the Indigenous Center of the Bolivian Amazon (*Central Indígena de la Amazonía Boliviana* - CIRABO).²⁰ This organization is a member of the Indigenous Center of Eastern Bolivia (*Central Indígena del Oriente Boliviano* – CIDOB), which is the strongest indigenous organization in the Bolivian lowlands.

According to the Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade, Brazil-nuts created 21,600 direct jobs and accounted for approximately three-quarters of economic activity in northern Bolivia in 2008. Overall, more than 50 percent of the total workforce in the region was linked to Brazil-nut production in 2005. Bolivian NGO data from 2005 indicates that 12,000 workers were engaged in Brazil-nut harvesting, of which an estimated 8,400 were salaried harvesters, 2,400 were peasant settlers, and 1,200 were indigenous workers. There were about 250 managers, 165 of whom were *barraca* owners and 85 whom were *rescatadores*.²¹ In Brazil-nut processing factories, a total of 22 registered employers employed 9,244 workers, including 7,500 *quebradores/as* (75 percent of whom were women), 140 administrative employees, 64 technicians, 180 truck drivers, 60 boat drivers, and 1,300 carriers.²²

There are two primary groups of workers in the Amazon Region: salaried employees and self-employed workers. Self-employed workers are comprised of indigenous peoples and peasant colonists who collect Brazil-nuts on land that was owned by the State and has been distributed to them through land grants. These State lands were also given as temporary concessions to *barraqueros* (rubber and Brazil-nut concessionaires) or were invaded by *barraqueros* and entrepreneurs who took advantage of the fact that the State had little authority in the region. These *barraqueros* and entrepreneurs employed salaried workers to work on the land and also forced workers to collect Brazil-nuts for them.

Another important group in the Bolivian Amazon is urban workers, who make up the salaried workforce in the Brazil-nut industry. The urban population in the Amazon region

is estimated to comprise approximately 30,000 adult inhabitants and their respective family members. Most live in the city of Riberalta, but some also live in smaller urban areas like Cobija, in the Department Pando, or in Puerto Rico. These urban populations are comprised of indigenous peoples from the Amazonian jungle and peasants from other areas of the country who left their lands in order to make a living in the Brazil-nut industry. They carry out seasonal Brazil-nut harvesting as salaried harvesters and work in Brazil-nut processing (washing, boiling, peeling and packing, mainly for export). These urban workers are generally unionized and are mainly comprised of workers affiliated with the COB.

At the other end of the spectrum is a group of entrepreneurs, who comprise the Chamber of Northern Exporters (*Cámara de Exportadores del Norte – CADEXNOR*). These entrepreneurs are primarily the owners of Brazil-nut factories that process the nuts. Factories export Brazil-nuts directly, sell their product to exporters, or sell their Brazil-nuts in the domestic market. Some owners of the processing plants continue to possess land grants, but due to the high level of social conflict created by the restructuring land grants, most private landowners have either abandoned their lands or are selling them to the indigenous people or peasant settlers.

Barraqueros were granted land concessions and used to hire workers year after year to harvest Brazil-nuts, recruiting indigenous workers that populated the areas that had been given to them, in many cases subjecting them to exploitive conditions of work. They also hired migrant salaried workers that were debt bonded to the *barraqueros*. There are accusations of *barraqueros* giving kickbacks to politicians for land grants. However, a Legislative Assembly has replaced the National Congress in the administration of land concessions and the amount of State land that can be granted is gradually decreasing. Furthermore, landowners have lost representatives in the Legislative Assembly and it is less likely now that senators can be bribed for land grants.

A recent actor in the Brazil-nut processing industry is the State, which has established a State-subsidized public Brazil-nut processing facility that supplies Brazil-nuts for the domestic market. Brazil-nuts have also been included as a component of school breakfasts that are distributed free of charge in Bolivian schools. This facility pays Brazil-nut producers a better price than other processing facilities and as a result has succeeded in increasing the price of raw Brazil-nuts. The State has also been active in redistributing land in the Amazon region.

The Chaco Region

The main inhabitants of the Chaco region are the indigenous Guaraní and Weenhayek.²³ The largest indigenous social group in the region is the Guaraní, which exerts hegemony over the other groups. The few remaining Tapietés live in southeast Bolivia, in the Gran Chaco province of Tarija Department.²⁴ The indigenous population is essentially Guaraní in Chuquisaca, while in Santa Cruz and Tarija, peasant farmers are combined with indigenous Guaraní, Weenhayek, and Tapietés.

Founded in 1994,²⁵ the Chuquisaca Captains' Council (*Consejo de Capitanes de Chuquisaca* - CCCH) is the main social organization in this area. CCCH is part of the Assembly of Guaraní People (*Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní* - APG), which itself is affiliated with CIDOB. The CCHH is the strongest group in the region, and has representative authorities called Captains in each community under its jurisdiction. CCHH played a significant role in the research, as they allowed researchers to access Guaraní communities in the Department of Chuquisaca, as well as other departments.

There is also a small population of peasant settlers from other regions that lives in the Chaco region of Chuquisaca. While there is a Union Federation of Peasant Workers (*Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos*) affiliated with CSUTCB, it has little contact with agrarian union leaders.

According to data from 2005, the department of Chuquisaca has approximately 7,955 inhabitants over 15 years of age who self-identify as Guaraní, while the region of Alto Parapetí has approximately 2,336 Guaraní inhabitants, representing 51 percent of the total population.²⁶ In 2010, there were an estimated 12,000 peanut growers in Bolivia, including 3,000 in the Chaco region.²⁷

Products


Brazil-nut Production in the Amazon Region

Brazil-Nut Production

Brazil-nuts grow in the wild and have been known by the natives of the region since pre-Columbian times. They were discovered by the European settlers in the early 19th century.²⁸ Brazil-nuts are harvested during the rainy season. The industrial processing of Brazil-nuts includes boiling, drying, peeling and packaging for export.


Brazil-nut Supply Chain in the Amazon Region²⁹

FLUJO DE LA AGROINDUSTRIA FORESTAL DE LA CASTAÑA AMAZONICA




Fuente: Elaboración de José Ignacio Jiménez S.

Brazil-Nut Supply Chain in Pando³⁰



Brazil-nut Production in the Amazon Region³¹



Fuente: Elaboración de José Ignacio Jiménez S.

In 2007, it was estimated that Bolivia had cornered 71 percent of the world's Brazil-nut market.³² The main export destinations in 2007 were the United Kingdom which received 43 percent of Bolivia's exports (8,192 tons), and the U.S. with 30 percent (5,867 tons).³³ In 2009, Bolivia exported USD 73 million worth of peeled and unpeeled Brazil-nuts. In 2009, the UK was the main destination of Bolivian Brazil-nuts, representing 29 percent of Bolivia's Brazil-nut exports; followed by the U.S. and Germany with 28 percent and 26 percent respectively.³⁴ Certified organic Brazil-nuts go for USD 19.40 per pound in the U.S. market.³⁵ However, the rate of organic certification of Brazil-nuts is still relatively low.³⁶

Reports of Forced Labor in the Production of Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region

The ILO reported in January 2005 that approximately 31,000 workers migrated seasonally to the Amazon to harvest Brazil-nuts, 5,000 to 6,000 of whom were subjected to forced labor.³⁷ In May 2005, the Bolivian government acknowledged conditions analogous to slavery in the Amazonian and Chaco regions by stating that, "effectively they are completely unprotected and the State is making efforts to try to implement some forms of protection, [and] is seeking consensus with the employers."³⁸ However, there have not been recent detailed reports on the systems that result in worker exploitation in the Brazil-nut sector in the Amazon region of Bolivia.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanut Production in the Bolivian Chaco Region

In the Chaco region, the most important economic activity in terms of earnings is the hydrocarbons, which does not employ a large number of workers. The majority of the population is involved in cattle ranching and subsistence agriculture, including corn, peanut, and soybean production in the municipalities of Yacuiba, Caraparí, Villamontes Macharetí and Muyupampa.³⁹

Rainfall patterns limit production, generate food crises, and feed into the cycle of extreme poverty in the region.⁴⁰ The scarcity creates the need for large tracts of land to feed cattle and limits agriculture to seasonal crops only viable in small ecological niches with enough available water. Global climate change worsens this fragile system with extreme periods of drought (the last one spanning from 2007 to 2010), which generate a permanent food crisis and foster increased population density in small areas and labor exploitation for food production. Periods of drought alternate with torrential rains (such as in 2011), which devastate the region and destroy roads. The *Unidad de Riesgos de la Gobernación del Departamento de Chuquisaca* (Risk Analysis Unit) released a warning in June 2010 announcing the onset of a food crisis in the Chaco region due to the severe drought. In some areas of the Chaco only ten to 20 percent of agricultural production remained viable, while in other regions there was reportedly no production.⁴¹

Cattle Production

Cattle production in the Bolivian Chaco began in 1589. Beginning in the 1970's, livestock production transitioned from being a subsistence activity to a commercial activity in the Chaco region. Livestock production is more widespread on the Chaco plains. It entails extensive land use and is highly dependent on vegetation but requires minimal investment in infrastructure. However, low productivity continues to be a problem due to sanitation issues, poor pasture lands, inadequate infrastructure, and, especially drought.⁴²

According to June 2010 reports, the severe drought affecting the Chaco region was decimating cattle herds, with the most deaths occurring in the municipality of Villa Montes, Tarija and Carandaití, Chuquisaca.⁴³ November 2010 reports revealed that the drought delayed crop planting, and that due to the chronic drought in the Bolivian Chaco, ranchers reported losses in the millions, from both the death of cattle and a lack of pasture land.⁴⁴ Paradoxically, in December 2011 rainfall in the Chaco region surpassed the historical record, resulting in severe flooding.⁴⁵ Due to these severe climatic fluctuations, livestock production in the Chaco region experiences severe ups and downs.

Corn Production

Bolivia has over 1,400 varieties of corn. Many indigenous corn farmers grow corn on small plots of land, producing enough corn for subsistence plus a small surplus. Low

yields are due to poor quality seeds, the absence of chemical or organic fertilizers, misuse of chemicals, and single crop farming.⁴⁶

The Association of Corn and Sorghum Producers (*Asociación de Productores de Maíz y Sorgo* - PROMASOR) reported that in 2008, 800,000 tons of corn were produced, 700,000 tons of which were for the domestic market. However, production decreased by 50 percent from 2008 to 2010.⁴⁷ In 2010, only 50,500 hectares of corn were planted, which was expected to yield 118,000 tons of corn.⁴⁸ In 2011, vegetable oil producers announced that they planned to plant more than 90,000 hectares and produce 360,000 tons of corn.⁴⁹

Corn, in particular, has suffered from the crisis brought on by the acute and chronic drought affecting the region. Climate change has also caused an exodus of Guaraní families from the Chaco region. At the end of 2010, a drought struck, destroying at least 60 percent of agricultural production on indigenous lands. In 2011, the lack of rain wiped out 80 percent of corn production. Due a lack of corn for animal feed, World Vision sheep and chicken breeding projects in the region were forced to shut down.⁵⁰

Peanut Production

In Bolivia, peanuts are planted between October and November and harvested in April and May. Immediately after they are harvested, the peanut pods are dried in the sun or artificially. Sun drying takes about two weeks.⁵¹

In 2006-2007, 500 tons of peanuts were produced, representing a significant increase from the 130 tons harvested in 2004.⁵² Peanut yields in 2007 were approximately a half a ton per hectare.⁵³ In 2008, producers were generally able to make a profit of USD 450 to USD 500 per hectare.⁵⁴ In 2008, 86 percent of peanuts were sold and 14 percent were used for household consumption.⁵⁵

Reports of Forced Labor in the Cattle, Corn, and Peanut Sectors in the Chaco Region

Roipota Tekove, a diagnosis on living conditions of the Guaraní population of Chuquisaca published in 1996 by the CCHH, reported the existence of 773 captive families in 106 *haciendas* (estates) in the Chaco region, which produce agricultural products, including cattle, corn, and peanuts.⁵⁶ However, in 1999, when another new CCCH diagnosis of living conditions was carried out, the captive population had decreased to 578 captive families on 121 *haciendas*, and 61 Guaraní settlements without their own land.⁵⁷

In 2004, a documentary from Spanish national TV (TVE) revealed the slave-like conditions under which indigenous workers lived on the Chaco estates. These reports were verified by the ILO,⁵⁸ the IACHR, the World Organization against Torture,⁵⁹ and regional leaders and local NGOs.⁶⁰

In July 2005, the Ministry of Sustainable Development, through the Vice Ministry of Land, published a report on the “project for the liberation of captive Guaraní families and communities,” which estimated a total of 449 captive families in the Alto Parapetí region, and 200 families in the area of Huacareta, Chuquisaca.⁶¹ Another study was published in 2005 on two small provinces in Chuquisaca by the Defender of the People (*el Defensor del Pueblo*), the CCHH, the Indigenous Peoples' Project (*Proyecto de Pueblos Indigenas*), and the Ministry of Justice. This study indicated “the existence of situations violating the human rights of captive Guaraní families.”⁶² The Defender of the People stated that, “in general, in the *haciendas* visited there was evidence of Guaraní families in debt bondage.” The report indicated that workers received advances of cash and/or in kind payments (usually used clothing and food) from landowners through verbal agreements and had to pay off these advances by working between ten and 12 hours per day for BOB 5-15 per day, including food. The report also indicated that teenage boys and girls were “loaned” to landowners for a period of about a year in exchange for registering them in school. These young workers known as “*criados*” were reportedly controlled by landlords from the time that they were very small children. In some cases, landowners were seen as father figures or “godparents,” which reinforced the relationship of dependency and subjugation.⁶³

Some more recent reports indicate that servitude continued to be an issue of concern in *haciendas* in the Chaco region. In June 2008, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights released an official report in which it was stated that, “Guaní families under servitude or forced labor conditions are living in extreme poverty while being subjected to severe punishments such as whippings, burning of their crops and death of their animals.”⁶⁴ According to reports from the ILO, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in 2008 more than 167 Guaraní families lived in 13 cattle estates in Alto Parapetí under a regime of servitude, debt bonded labor, or under other conditions analogous to slavery.⁶⁵ The UN denounced continued servitude in 2009.⁶⁶ In March 2010, the APG reported that at least 1,049 families continued to live in conditions analogous to slavery in 44 communities in Southeastern Bolivia.⁶⁷ In April 2010, the Organization of American States' (OEA) Commission of Human Rights reported that 600 Guaraní families from the Chaco region were being subjected to forced labor and servitude, and urged the State to “prevent, investigate and penalize these modern forms of slavery.”⁶⁸ In February 2011, 59 cases of servitude involving indigenous peoples were discovered in Caraparí and Yacuiba, Tarija Department, and 11 were identified in the province of Cercado.⁶⁹

Policies and Programs

The Bolivian government has legal mechanisms to combat forced labor, and has been active in doing so, but has a limited capacity, especially in isolated areas. Bolivia has a legal framework to address land redistribution, which it has used to combat forced labor. The government may redistribute land to indigenous and peasant communities, including unused lands, lands that do not serve the common good, or lands on which

forced labor is being used. However, land redistribution has created a great deal of conflict, both in the Amazon and Chaco regions (See *Appendix 1: Land Redistribution in Bolivia*). Bolivia has a broad legal framework to address forced labor, human trafficking, and other forms of worker exploitation (see *Appendix 2: Legal Framework*). The government has carried out programs to combat forced labor with varying degrees of success, and problems remain in the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Amazon and Chaco regions

In 2003, the government signed an agreement with the APG committing to form a “technical commission in charge of designing a project to free captive Guaraní communities in Alto Parapetí, and to provide them with enough land, with a minimum of 50,000 hectares”, and stating that “this same commission will also consider cases from Ingre, Huacareta, Añimbo, Kaami, and others presented by APG”.⁷⁰ In 2005, faced both with a new central government role in the region and a changing balance of power, some landlords chose to recognize Guaraní captive families' rights to land, and allotted some land to them, although usually in places unsuitable for agriculture, and with an average of five hectares per family. In some cases, to prevent the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) from granting Guaraní families their property rights, the landlords expelled them from their estates.⁷¹

In 2005, the Defender of the People demanded that each Bolivian State agency carry out a number of measures to combat servitude among Guaranís in the Chaco region through the development of a comprehensive and sustainable strategy aimed to resolve the issue. The goals included guaranteeing Guaraní people the right to justice and human rights; regulation of the process of land redistribution; respect of the Guaraní people in the country's social, economic, and legal systems; the establishment of labor, social security, and child and juvenile labor courts in the Chaco region; immediate action by departmental and municipal authorities to ensure inhabitants' survival; and increased educational services.⁷² In December 2007, a Supreme Decree authorized the expropriation of 180,000 hectares of land in order to reconstitute the Guaraní territory.⁷³

These actions reduced the scale of forced labor, but there are regional variations within the Chaco region and these measures have failed to reach isolated areas. For example, Alto Parapetí comprises a valley circled by two mountain ranges. The main access points to Alto Parapetí consist of a river that runs through one of the mountain ranges and narrow paths, which makes it a very difficult place to access. This isolation has permitted estate owners to conceal the servitude the conditions of workers there.

A 2005 study found that the State was not effective in protecting workers, resulting in the continued existence of labor exploitation, servitude, and debt bondage.⁷⁴ In May 2005, Bolivian government authorities openly recognized to an international news agency the existence of conditions analogous to slavery both in the Amazonian and Chaco regions and stated that the state would take measures to protect workers.

A 2009 report entitled “United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Mission to Bolivia: Report and Recommendations” found a failure to comply with a number of international conventions, including ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labor. The study

stated that the State was weak in the Chaco region and that the Bolivian government must adopt urgent measures to combat child labor; restrictions on freedom of association and movement; systematic violence against indigenous peoples; the inability of indigenous people to obtain identification documents and the consequent exclusion from State benefits; discrimination; and a lack of impartiality of the judicial system.⁷⁵

A May 2009 UN Mission to the "United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues" recommended that the government:

- guarantee the right to consent to working conditions to indigenous peoples, especially Guaranís;
- strengthen its institutions in the Chaco region with respect to labor issues, security, and justice;
- improve social dialogue in the Chaco region in order to eradicate forced labor and servitude; and
- combat discrimination of indigenous peoples.

The Ministry of Labor, in its annual report for 2009, noted that twenty inspectors were trained to work on the issue of forced labor and servitude, in order to implement a cooperative project with the Swiss government, "*Presencia del Estado para la Restitución de los Derechos Fundamentales*." The Ministry of Labor reported on the implementation of a database to quantify the incidence of forced labor and servitude through labor inspections in the areas of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando. Follow-up inspections and monitoring work were carried out in Brazil-nut production areas, as well as on *haciendas* in the Chaco region in compliance with the recommendations of the United Nations and the Comprehensive Development Plan for the Guaraní Nation.⁷⁶

The Triple Seal (*Triple Sello*) is an instrument that was promoted by the Bolivian Foreign Trade Institute (IBCE) in coordination with the Bolivian Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security as a method of encouraging compliance with labor rights and the United Nations Global Compact. This seal would be awarded to companies that have demonstrated that they do not use child labor, discrimination, or forced labor in the entire production chain.⁷⁷

The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has highlighted, "the steps taken by the Bolivian government to identify situations of servitude, forced labor, debt bondage and slavery of captive families."⁷⁸ However, in 2010, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continued to state that Bolivia must implement necessary legislation to ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples were recognized and protected.⁷⁹

Methodology & Limitations

Verité's research in Bolivia aimed to assess the presence of, and circumstances surrounding, indicators of forced labor in sections of the supply chains for Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and peanuts.

The following broad priorities guided the research:

- identifying and documenting indicators of forced labor among workers in the supply chains for Brazil nuts, cattle, corn and peanuts in Bolivia
- documenting the broader conditions experienced by workers in above-stated four supply chains
- identifying risk factors for vulnerability to forced labor among workers in the above-stated four supply chains

Research activities were supervised by Verité's Latin America coordinator and managed by a local Research Coordinator. The research team additionally included a lawyer, four anthropologists, a psychologist, two linguistic experts, and local worker interviewers who spoke Spanish and indigenous languages.

Verité used a mixed methods approach, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative research techniques in order to ensure the triangulation of findings. The research commenced with a literature and legal review, expert consultations, and a rapid appraisal process, which included a mapping of the supply chain and the main actors involved and qualitative stakeholder interviews in order to rapidly obtain a working knowledge of the sector. Field research comprised qualitative and quantitative interviews, focus group discussions, and case studies. Upon completion of the field research, the data were collated, coded, and analyzed by the Research Coordinator and the research team. The responses to the questionnaire were analyzed according to ILO guidance on "Identifying Forced Labor in Practice," described in the Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor section. The ways in which questions from the questionnaire were used to determine whether indicators of forced labor were present can be found in *Appendix 9: Chart of Findings by Product*.

A report was then drafted and submitted to the research grant's Project Director/Principal Investigator, followed by further analysis and formatting by Verité using the guiding framework that was applied to all seven countries studied under its research grant. Verité also conducted a post-hoc analysis of data in all seven country studies by applying a larger set of forced labor indicators issued by the ILO in December 2011 (*Hard to see, harder to count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate the Forced Labour of Adults of Children*), which are intended for use in forced labor survey design and analysis but which were not available at the time the fieldwork was carried out. See Appendices 10 and 11 for a chart reflecting this analysis.

Research Design

As noted in the Research Timing section below, the research on Brazil-nuts commenced first; followed by research on cattle, corn, and peanuts. While the timing for research of the various goods differed, the main phases and research processes did not.

The research process for each supply chain began with an extensive literature review and series of expert consultations. For each supply chain under study, the literature review and initial expert consultations focused on the history of the production of each good and a mapping of the supply chain and the various workers involved, the geopolitical and economic history of each region to be studied, information on general working and living conditions and social/cultural/political history of inhabitants of the regions, and any history or previous evidence of labor violations or forced labor in the region or the production of the good. Sources consulted included academic journal articles, articles from newspapers and periodicals, and reports from government agencies and non-profits. An extensive legal review was also conducted, and included a review of all available legal documentation from domestic and international jurisprudence; constitutional law; and labor, agrarian, and criminal law.

A thorough review of quantitative and qualitative research methods, particularly as regards research on vulnerable populations, was conducted.

Finally, the research team was trained on the international and national legal instruments relating to forced labor and human trafficking; and Verité's frame of analysis for the study. In designing the research, the ILO definition of forced labor was used as the basis for developing all paths and methods of inquiry. Indicators of forced labor were identified, and initial research questions to capture those indicators were developed. The study was designed additionally to capture other indicators of exploitative conditions of work.

Based on the outcomes of the desk review and expert consultations, geographic areas of focus were identified, and workers and employers were classified according to their location in the supply chain and the nature of the work performed.

It was determined that different categories of workers should be established in order to differentiate between the experiences of salaried workers and self-employed workers (defined as laborers who work independently, producing and selling their products). Workers comprised both native indigenous people and peasant settlers who were self-employed in production of Brazil-nuts, corn, peanuts, or cattle. The full range of workers included:

- For self-employed workers:
 - Indigenous workers who hold collective land rights
 - Peasants who do not belong to an indigenous ethnic group with ancestral land rights, and whose land tenure is instead mediated through government land allocation.

- Workers who transport and process products in their own facilities
- For salaried workers:
 - Permanent factory workers working in the industrial processing of products
 - Temporary workers or harvesters hired for a harvest
 - Piece workers or day-laborers who work from day to day without a contract
 - Contract workers engaged for a specific task
 - Permanent contract workers who acquire the status of employees; and
 - Workers who work and live on land they do not own

Research instruments were developed for interviews that would yield both qualitative and quantitative data; focus groups and case studies; and a database for collecting and analyzing results for each good was designed. Researchers went into the field to interview workers and other key informants and stakeholders from employers, NGOs, unions, government and other institutions at the national, regional, and local levels.

Based on the results of the desk research and rapid appraisals, the interview instruments were developed by the research team through several workshops. Two types of questionnaires were developed: one for self-employed workers and another for salaried workers. With respect to the supply chain for Brazil-nuts, for salaried workers, separate questionnaires were developed for Brazil-nut collectors, factory workers, and farm workers. The surveys were designed to collect information about worker demographics, paths of entry into employment, labor brokerage mechanisms, debt, indicators of forced labor, and other issues of concern (working and living conditions, harassment and abuse, child labor, etc.).

Specific research questions for each sector and type of worker included:

- questions designed to frame the inquiry, including:
 - classification of the worker and indication of place in supply chain
 - location of interview
- questions designed to solicit basic demographic data on workers:
 - age
 - gender
 - highest level of formal education attained
 - marital status and household composition
 - ethnicity
 - languages spoken
 - status of land ownership for individual and his/her community
 - employment history
- (for salaried workers) questions focused on the path of entry into current employment:
 - how information about the job was obtained
 - hiring procedure and any role for middlemen
 - employment agreement and presence of a verbal or written contract
 - evidence of contract substitution

- relations with or obligations to any union(s)
- evidence of lack of consent, deception, fees paid, loans taken
- other evidence of trafficking
- questions designed to solicit information on existence and circumstances of debt
 - presence of debt, at beginning and end of harvest season
 - circumstances of debt – reason for and time of borrowing, interest, to whom debt is held, whether it acts as a binding agent, whether it is inherited
 - patterns of debt-taking, evidence of inherited debt
 - payment arrangements
- questions designed to solicit information on transportation arrangements
- questions designed to solicit information on working conditions
 - wages and payment mechanisms
 - hours of work (including evidence of compulsory/forced overtime)
 - health and safety
 - verbal/physical harassment
 - threats and reprisals
 - discrimination
 - termination of work relationship
- questions designed to solicit information on living conditions
- questions designed to solicit information on freedom of movement, including
 - geographic, physical or cultural isolation
 - presence of guards or other surveillance
 - ability/freedom to communicate with outside world
- questions designed to solicit information on harassment, including evidence of
 - sexual harassment
 - verbal or physical harassment
 - supernatural or religious threat
 - other cultural, economic, or religious threat
- questions designed to solicit information on presence and nature of child labor
 - demographic information on child laborers, and information on school attendance
 - information from parents on decision for child to work, entry into sector
 - working tasks and conditions of children
 - incidence of verbal, physical or sexual abuse

The first drafts of the questionnaires were peer reviewed in the La Paz office and personnel were trained to ensure that they understood all of the concepts and data collection procedures. For the Brazil-nuts study, the questionnaires were tested in four workshops held with peasant harvesters, indigenous self-employed harvesters, salaried harvesters, and factory workers to ensure that the language was comprehensible, the questions were appropriate, and all issues were covered. Pilot testing of questionnaires was also carried out among self-employed workers in the cattle, corn, and peanuts sector in Monteagudo, causing the questionnaire to be redesigned and retested. For the cattle, corn, and peanut sectors, the questionnaires were also translated into Guaraní and Quechua. For the complete questionnaires, see Appendices 3 through 7.

Field researchers conducted interviews in pairs or trios, where one researcher was a trained anthropologist and the other, fluent in the necessary indigenous language(s) and culture(s). Female interviewers were included in the research teams to avoid gender bias in interviews and to complement the male researchers. All staff were trained and fully briefed to ensure their availability and ability to withstand the rigorous travel conditions.

Brazil-Nut Research Methodology

Research Timing

Field research on Brazil-nuts was carried out from March 2009 through May 2010. Since workers were interviewed about their employment over the previous year, the research covered the period of March 2008 through May 2010.

A research office in La Paz was established by the Research Coordinator and an administrative assistant was hired in March of 2009. A literature review for Brazil-nuts was conducted from March through October 2009.

Brazil-nut harvest work is seasonal. The Brazil-nut harvest is an intensive process, lasting three months from mid-December to mid-March with remaining nuts being collected until mid-April.

Field work unfolded in two phases: a rapid appraisal to inform the development of a quantitative survey supplemented by qualitative research.

The rapid appraisal was initiated just before the harvest season began, in November and December of 2009. This is the time when harvest workers are typically recruited. The quantitative survey was administered to returned workers in their home communities, directly following the harvest, in April and May of 2010. The decision to administer the survey to returned workers in their home communities was made based on findings from the rapid appraisal that workers would be too busy and vulnerable during the intensive harvesting season to be able to participate in an in-depth quantitative survey. It was impossible to observe or engage with workers during the harvest without the express permission of, and supervision by, employers. Conducting the survey amongst returned workers ensured that workers would be comfortable and safe in engaging with researchers.

For the rapid appraisal, researchers traveled to the Bolivian Amazon Region from November 11 to December 6, 2009. The trip from La Paz to Riberalta took two days, covering a distance of 912 km (567 miles) on a mountainous gravel road from La Paz to Yucumo, and to Llano de Yucumo in Riberalta.

In Riberalta, background interviews were conducted with management; labor representatives; local authorities; representatives of the Brazil-nut industry; indigenous peoples; public land license holders, locally known as *barraqueros*; transporters; Brazil-nut harvesters, locally known as *zafreiros*; representatives of the commonwealth of the Bolivian Amazon and the Municipal Government of Riberalta; and local NGOs; among others.

These interviews were used to verify the findings in the desk research, and to secure the support of local authorities to allow the research to take place in their communities.

To clarify the general conditions of life and work of Brazil-nut workers, Verité researchers held a series of workshops as follows:

- One workshop was held in Riberalta city, with the leaders of the Brazil-nut harvesters' unions. Attendance included 14 representatives of seven unions, to which a great majority of the workers are affiliated.
- A second workshop was held also in Riberalta city, for leaders of the unions of factory workers. Attendance included 14 representatives from 14 factories.
- A third workshop was held in the Esse Ejja community of Portachuelo Medio, for indigenous leaders. Participants included representatives from each indigenous group that is part of the Indigenous Multiethnic Territory II and its directorate. (This comprises the Tacana, Esse Ejja, Machineri, Cavineño, Chacobo, and other smaller groups.) One hundred and fifty people attended the indigenous workshop.
- Four workshops were held with representatives of peasants' unions, from the Federation of Peasant Workers of Beni and Pando. This included 14 members of the directorate of the federation and 14 representatives of the same number of peasant communities.
- At each of the 25 indigenous and peasant communities visited, an initial workshop to introduce the research team and the purpose of the research was held in a participatory approach for all members of the community. The number of attendants varied from 12 to up to 60 participants, with an average of 18 adults and at least three times as many children.

These workshops yielded critical information about the harvest and the industrial processing of Brazil-nuts; the participation of each of these groups of workers in the production chain; and the historical evolution of labor abuses in this industry.

The quantitative survey instrument was designed based on the results of the rapid appraisal, from December 2009 through March 2010. As stated above, the survey was delivered in April and May 2010.

Qualitative research was conducted after the harvest, to supplement the survey. Verité researchers arranged visits after the end of the harvest with the leaders of key Brazil-nut producing communities. During these visits, the researchers went to the *barracas* and harvest trails where the Brazil-nut pickers worked and conducted contextual interviews with community leaders, guides, transporters, and Brazil-nut producers in their communities and where they were harvesting the nuts. Under these conditions,

researchers were able to conduct semi-formal meetings to analyze employment situations. In addition, casual interviews conducted with children and young people as informal conversations provided useful information on working conditions. Information yielded from these informal, qualitative interviews served as context and background for analyzing the results of the quantitative survey.

Data processing and analysis were performed from June through November 2010.

Research Location and Scope

Research on Brazil-nuts was conducted in the Amazon region of Bolivia. Brazil-nuts are cultivated in the entire Amazon basin region, which extends from the foothills of the Cordillera Real or Oriental to the northeastern border with Brazil. The region covers the entire departments of Pando and Beni, the north and center of the department of La Paz, and the northern and central departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.

Verité's research study focused on the department of Pando, the Iturralde provinces in the northern La Paz department, and the Vaca Diez and Ballivian provinces in the department of Beni.

In Pando, the study included: a) the municipalities of Nuevo Manoa, Villa Nueva and Santos Mercado in the Federico Román province; b) the municipalities of Santa Rosa and Ingavi in the Abuná province; c) the municipalities of G. Moreno, San Lorenzo, Sena, in the Madre de Dios province; d) the municipalities of Puerto Rico and San Pedro in the Manuripi province and the municipality of Filadelfia, which was not visited but was investigated indirectly; e) the Nicolás Suárez province, in which the municipalities of Cobija, Bolpebra and Porvenir were also not visited but were studied indirectly through informants who came from these areas. Rural and indigenous communities and townships in twelve of the fifteen municipalities in Pando were visited.

In the department of Beni, the study included the municipalities of Riberalta and Guayaramerín in the province of Vaca Diez. In the department of La Paz, the municipality of Ixiamas, in the province of Iturralde, was studied indirectly.

Overall in the Amazonian region, fifteen municipalities were studied, 12 through direct visits and three indirectly through informants from these areas (See *Appendix 8: Worker Interview Locations*).

In Pando and Beni, contextual interviews were carried out in three major urban centers including the cities of Riberalta, Cobija and the township of Puerto Rico, as follows:

- In Riberalta, nine background interviews were held: one with the president of CADEXNOR, the Brazil-nut exporters association; another with the president of the Barraqueros' Association; another with the president of MANUNAB, the association of municipalities of the Amazonian region of Bolivia; three with local NGO's representatives; one with the president of the Peasant Cooperative; one with a member of the Municipal Council of Riberalta and the last one with the

local officer of the Ministry of Labor.

- In Cobija four background interviews were held: one with a factory owner and another with an INRA officer, another with a member of the Federation of Peasants of Pando, and the last one with a person who was present at the time of the Massacre of Filadelfia and Porvenir (a civil confrontation of members of the local government and indigenous and peasants who attempted to defend the regional office of INRA).
- In Puerto Rico, two background interviews were held: one with the owner of a local factory and the other with the administrator of the dock.
- In each location, researchers also held community workshops to analyze the social, economic and labor conditions related to Brazil-nut production.

Ten exploratory trips were made to 25 indigenous and peasant communities. At each community, a number of Brazil-nut harvest paths were visited, with one to five *payoles* per path. (A *payole* is a rustic silo where Brazil-nuts are temporarily stored.) A total of 112 *payoles* were visited to gather direct evidence of the general working conditions, and more specifically, evidence of forced labor in Brazil-nut collection.

Twenty-seven case studies were conducted to illustrate processes of hiring, working and termination of work, including three studies on salaried Brazil-nut harvesters, five on peasant Brazil-nut harvesters, four on indigenous Brazil-nut harvesters, and three on factory workers. These case studies provided general portraits of the types of workers. The remaining twelve illustrated specific issues related to vulnerability to forced labor conditions, such as indebtedness, isolation, mechanisms of coercion and so on.

For the study of Brazil-nut production in the Amazon region of Bolivia, over 300 surveys were administered to returned workers, which yielded 273 valid surveys after evaluation of the data. The surveys of Brazil-nut harvesters and the verification of findings through expert consultations and qualitative interviews were performed during research trips to the *barracas* in the Department of Pando, and in the Vaca Diez province of the Department of Beni in northeast Bolivia. The surveys of laborers returned from the harvest and of factory workers were carried out in the city of Riberalta in Vaca Diez province, in the Department of Beni, the geopolitical center of the Amazon region and the industrial and commercial center of Brazil-nut production; in the city of Cobija, capital of Pando Department; and in Puerto Rico, a town with a Brazil-nut processing plant. Researchers conducted interviews with workers from the five provinces in the department of Pando and its 15 municipalities, one municipality in the Iturralde province in the North of the department of La Paz, and two municipalities in the province Vaca Diez in Beni, for a total of eight provinces and 18 municipalities. The research targeted self-employed indigenous and peasant workers and salaried harvesters and factory workers.

Sampling and Access

The population working in the Brazil-nut industry in Bolivia is concentrated in the Amazon region, which is the area covered by this study. The total population involved in

Brazil-nut production in 2010 was 151,933, including workers and their family members, as Brazil-nut harvesting involves the whole family, including children.⁸⁰ As the average size of each family is 5.6 people per family, one can surmise that there are approximately 27,131 families involved in Brazil-nut production.⁸¹ There were approximately 21,600 heads of household or “account owners” that worked in Brazil-nut production in 2005.⁸² The sampling plan relied on this assumption. While researchers ensured that the sample captured both permanent and temporary workers who worked in all of the Brazil-nut producing municipalities and companies, no quotas were applied, so the sample was not proportional to the number of temporary and permanent workers employed in each municipality and company.

Over 300 individual members of households were interviewed, resulting in 273 valid surveys. Surveys were deemed “ind” if the interviewers determined that the workers did not work in the sector under study, if the workers worked in regions outside the area of study, or if the information was incomplete (the respondent did not finish the interview or did not want to provide key information). This did not affect the validity of the findings. For this study, workers were broken down into two categories: salaried workers who work for employers and self-employed workers who sell their Brazil-nuts. Salaried workers include harvesters and factory workers, mainly *quebradores/as* who are generally female workers who break/peel the Brazil-nuts. Self-employed workers include indigenous workers and peasant settlers who work on their own land or communal lands. Estimates from 2005 indicate that there were 8,400 salaried harvesters; 7,500 salaried factory workers; 1,200 indigenous self-employed harvesters; and 2,500 peasant settler harvesters.⁸³

These four groups of workers were covered by the sample. Of the 273 workers surveyed:

- 74 (27 percent) were salaried harvesters;
- 92 (34 percent) were salaried factory workers, including 22 permanent workers and 70 temporary workers;
- 39 (14 percent) were self-employed indigenous harvesters; and
- 66 (24 percent) were self-employed peasant settler harvesters.

The quantitative sample was a nonrandom, convenience sample. Researchers ensured that the sample included workers who had worked in all of the various municipalities in which Brazil-nut harvesting takes place. Researchers further intended for the sample to capture the full spectrum of contracting relationships, including workers who worked directly with *barraqueros*, workers who worked for managers used by the *barraqueros* or Brazil-nut processors, workers hired by *rescatadores* (irregular or intermediary subcontractors) to work on indigenous or peasant lands, workers who worked directly for the peasants or indigenous landowners, and workers hired by indigenous or peasants' leaders to work on communal land or collective property.

Workers to be interviewed were selected through snowball sampling. Workers were interviewed in their home communities, in areas surrounding Riberalta and Cobija.

Individuals were identified for interviewing through networking with community members.

For factory workers, the quantitative sample was also a nonrandom convenience sample; and researchers ensured that the sample included workers from all companies involved in the processing of Brazil-nuts and that both temporary and permanent workers were interviewed. Factory workers were similarly identified for interviewing through snowball sampling.

Interviews with factory workers initially took place at their homes; but it became clear that workers were not comfortable. It was then decided to interview workers privately, at hotels. But this, too, proved problematic. Local Brazil-nut factory owners became aware of the research, and local community actors who were helping to facilitate the research began to fear reprisals. Therefore, Verité determined that it was becoming too risky for researchers and workers alike, and pulled out of Riberalta.

A total of 273 valid surveys were administered to 66 self-employed peasant harvesters, 41 self-employed indigenous harvesters, 74 salaried harvesters, and 92 factory workers.

Data Processing and Analysis

Data processing and analysis for Brazil-nuts was performed from June through November 2010. Survey data was entered into the quantitative database. Transcripts of taped interviews, records of qualitative information from surveys and case studies, and the notes taken in the workshops were incorporated in the qualitative documentation. Quantitative and qualitative data were then analyzed according to Verité's framework for evaluating forced labor indicators and vulnerabilities, based on ILO indicators of forced labor.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts Research Methodology

Research Timing

Field research on cattle, corn, and peanuts was carried out from October 2010 through September 2011. Since workers were interviewed about their employment over the previous year, the research covered the period of October 2009 through September 2011.

Research in Bolivia was expanded in April 2010 to include the production of cattle, corn and peanuts in the Chaco region. The research protocols developed for Brazil-nuts were adapted for the inquiries into cattle, corn and peanuts.

A literature review and expert consultations were performed from June through August of 2010.

Corn and peanut production has an annual production cycle, while cattle herding is an ongoing process. The cultivation of corn and peanuts depends on climatic conditions, as the areas of production generally lack reservoirs and irrigation facilities. There are two periods of labor intensive cultivation for corn and peanuts. First the land must be prepared and planted, which takes place between September and November, depending on the spring rains. Second, there is the harvest season, which lasts from March to May. In cattle ranching there is a fattening season during the late December to mid-March rains. This is the time when the white carob shrubs (*Prosopis alba*) provide food for the cattle.

Research was designed in two phases: a rapid appraisal phase, in which complaints of forced labor were investigated and the survey designed; and a quantitative and qualitative research phase.

The original plan was for the rapid appraisal phase to occur before the peak harvest, and for the quantitative and qualitative research to be conducted during peak harvest. As will be explained below, this schedule was revised slightly based on unforeseen research challenges.

From October 23rd to December 14th, 2010 the team made initial visits to the Chaco region. One of the initial tasks was to seek out two linguists to support the study. A Quechua linguist was recruited in Cochabamba, and a Guaraní linguist in the Chaco region. Research then began in Monteagudo.

The team then had a serious car accident in which several team members were injured. While arranging for the medical care and a new vehicle, the team was stranded in Camiri, where the researchers used their time to carry out contextual interviews with executives of the APG and the Teko Guaraní NGO to seek their support in the investigation.

Project activities then resumed, with travel from Camiri to Monteagudo, the seat of the Chuquisaca Council of Captains. The process of securing authorization from the Guaraní Captains of Chuquisaca took two weeks, during which the team had to remain in Monteagudo. While waiting for authorization, the researchers conducted research on working conditions in peanut, corn, and cattle production in the municipalities of Monteagudo and Muyupampa with the rural population of self-employed indigenous Guaraní, and Quechua workers, who the researcher determined did not exhibit indicators of forced labor.

Continuing in a single vehicle, the team carried out interviews on indicators of forced labor in Tarija and Santa Cruz with a downsized team of three permanent researchers and a guide.

Verité researchers obtained permission to do research in the three departments under study from the Council of Captains of the Guaraní people, the Weenhayek, and the independent farmers' unions. Researchers also carried out background interviews,

through which they identified the areas associated with reports of indicators of forced labor.

Rapid appraisal data collection was scheduled to begin in February 2011; however, it was delayed because after three years of drought in the Chaco region, torrential rains struck from late January until mid March. The unpaved and narrow access roads to towns and communities became impassable. Therefore, during February and March researchers carried out an in-depth literature review.

Despite the severity of the rains and the bad road conditions, roads again became passable in 4-wheel drive light vehicles in April 2011, at which time the researchers began the process of gathering information. The first stage of data collection lasted 70 days, from April 4 to June 6, 2011, with two teams traveling in separate vehicles. Each team included a male and female researcher, a trained male and female Guaraní interviewer, a local guide, and a driver in charge of logistics.

The survey phase of research took place from May 1 to September 24, 2011, during which researchers were able to interview a larger number of workers.

The processing of information collected in the survey phase took place from September to late October 2011.

Research Location and Scope

The study focused on the Chaco region because this area includes all three products and because it has been the target of international allegations of conditions approximating forced labor. The Chaco region includes the provinces of Luis Calvo and Hernando Siles in the Department of Chuquisaca, the provinces of Gran Chaco and O'Connor in the Department of Tarija, and the province of Cordillera in the Department of Santa Cruz. There are a total of 16 municipalities, of which 15 were included in the study, with one being excluded due to the reluctance of local authorities to participate.

Of the 184 communities in Chuquisaca, only the community of Tentapiao was excluded from the investigation because it has never been extensively visited by non-Guaraní. Verité researchers visited 24 communities in Huacareta; 16 in Ingre, 27 in Monteagudo, eight in Muyupampa, 16 in Igüembe, and 13 in Huacaya, for a total of 104 communities visited in the Department of Chuquisaca.

Of 145 registered communities in Villamontes, Verité researchers visited four Weenhayek indigenous communities and six mixed and Guaraní communities, for a total of ten communities visited in Villamontes.

Verité researchers also visited 23 mixed communities in Yacuiba, and 12 in Caraparí, making a total of 45 communities visited in the Chaco of the Department of Tarija.

Of the 80 registered communities in the Cordillera province of Santa Cruz Department, Verité researchers visited five in Camiri, eight in Charagua, 12 in Gutierrez, four in Lagunillas, two in Boyuibe, and six in Cuevo, for a total of 37 communities.

In conclusion, of the 409 registered communities in the geographic area covered by the study, Verité researchers visited 186 communities (45 percent). Of the 184 communities in Chuquisaca, Verité researchers visited 104 (57 percent); of the 145 in Tarija, Verité researchers visited 45 (31 percent); and of the 80 in Santa Cruz, Verité researchers visited 37 (46 percent). For a detailed chart of the number of workers interviewed in each location, see *Appendix 8: Worker Interview Locations*.

The rapid appraisal phase investigated complaints that had been made by the Captains of the Guaraní People's Assembly involving indicators of forced labor in the most remote areas. Research began in Lagunillas, Santa Cruz in rural communities and then moved to the three deep valleys of the Chaco region of Chuquisaca: the valley of Monteagudo and Rosario del Ingre, the valley of Muyupampa and Igüembe, and the valleys of Huacareta and Uruguay. The teams then moved to the plains to undertake research in the Huacaya valley and in Cuevo, Santa Cruz. Teams then proceeded north to Camiri to secure the support of the Captains' Council of Santa Cruz; moved on to Charagua; returned to cover Boyuibe, south of Santa Cruz; entered the plain towards Macharetí Chuquisaca, emerged into the Gran Chaco of Tarija Department, and traveled through Villamontes, Yacuiba, and Caraparí. From this point the teams returned to Yacuiba. On the way back to La Paz, researchers carried out research in the municipality of Gutierrez. All complaints were investigated along with an active search for additional indicators of forced labor. However, due to the remoteness of many *haciendas*, the poor roads, and the fact that many had been abandoned due to the previous three years of drought, a lower number of workers were interviewed than expected.

For the quantitative study, over 750 workers were interviewed, a total of 601 of whose surveys were judged to be valid. Surveys were deemed “invalid” if the interviewers determined that the workers did not work in the sectors under study, if the workers worked in regions outside the area of study, or if the information was incomplete. This did not affect the validity of the findings.

Sampling and Access

The population living in the Chaco region covered by this study was estimated at 21,681 in 2009. The population was comprised of approximately 3,870 families.⁸⁴ Interviews were carried with one member of each family. Therefore, the 601 valid surveys carried out covered approximately three percent of the population and 16 percent of the total number of families in the region under study.

Agricultural production is undergoing a process of rapid change in the Chaco region due to land redistribution and drought (see *Background and Setting*). Therefore, the labor force is also changing rapidly, with a large number of workers changing jobs and/or

working in cattle, corn, and peanut production simultaneously, as these products are produced on the same *haciendas* or individual or communal lands; and/or have different harvesting/production seasons, allowing workers to work in different sectors at the same time or at different times of the year. Therefore, rather than analyzing data based on the sector that workers worked in, researchers split cattle, corn, and peanut workers into two categories: salaried workers and self-employed workers.

The study was carried out in two phases. The first phase was the in-depth phase, during which 62 salaried workers and 71 self-employed workers were interviewed, for a total of 133 surveys. Among the self-employed workers, 42 indigenous workers, 26 peasant settlers, and three *parceleros* (workers who had inherited parcels of land from the *haciendas* they had worked on) were interviewed. Indigenous workers came from the Guaraní and Weenhayek indigenous groups. During this phase, *hacienda* owners and *capitanes guaraníes* were interviewed in each community.

Verité made a determination that 133 surveys were insufficient for the number of workers employed in the area under study, as the sample size was too small. Therefore, a second phase of surveys was planned and carried out. During this phase, 404 surveys were implemented, including interviews of 326 self-employed workers and 78 salaried workers. It is important to note that the majority of self-employed workers interviewed had been working on *haciendas* for less than three years.

Workers were selected for interviews using nonprobability convenience sampling. They were interviewed in their place of work or communities. Interviews were carried out in Guaraní and Spanish.

Between both phases of the study, over 750 workers were interviewed, and 601 surveys were judged to be complete and valid. Of those surveyed, 537 worked in corn production, 278 worked in peanut production, and 233 worked in cattle production. Given that the vast majority of workers worked in the production of two or more products, most surveys provided information about more than one product. Of the 537 corn producers interviewed 140 (26 percent) were salaried workers and 397 (74 percent) were self-employed. Of the 278 peanut producers interviewed, 102 (37 percent) were salaried and 176 (63 percent) were self-employed. Of the 233 cattle producers, 100 (43 percent) were salaried and 133 (57 percent) were self-employed. The sample size was determined based on INE data on the population of the Chaco region linked to the production of each good. More self-employed than salaried workers were interviewed, as self-employed workers comprised the majority of the workforce.

Of 601 worker interviews for cattle, corn and peanuts, 70 percent took place in private and 30 percent in the presence of others, usually family members. The comfort and credibility of the informants was judged by researchers to be high.

Data Processing and Analysis

The processing of information collected in the survey phase for cattle, corn, and peanuts took place from late September to late October and followed the procedures described above for the data processing for Brazil-nuts.

From November 1 until December 15, 2011, the research team consolidated and tabulated the data for the four products under study and completed the qualitative analysis of case studies.

This work was carried out by the Research Coordinator, the Fieldwork Coordinator, a researcher who participated in the entire study, and an expert in quantitative data processing.

Challenges and Limitations

Challenges

In October 2010, in the vicinity of Mocomocal, one of the research team's vehicles suffered a full rollover when the narrowness of the road and an oncoming truck made the car hit a large hole at the edge of the pavement. The car was totaled and members of the research team suffered injuries, including a broken rib, and chest and abdominal compression caused by seatbelt pressure. The injured members of the research team were treated at the Emergency Room in the Camiri Hospital, then in the city of Santa Cruz, and additionally in La Paz when they returned home. This accident caused a ten day delay to the project's field activities, unanticipated expenses, the loss of one of two vehicles contracted for the research, and the loss of two members of the research team due to the trauma of the accident.

Severe rains in the spring of 2011 slowed the research on cattle, corn, and peanuts; as did a delay in securing approval from community leaders to conduct the research. The Research Coordinator was the victim of a violent assault in La Paz in the spring of 2011 that resulted in two surgeries and necessitated scheduling and team composition changes for the survey portion of the cattle, corn, and peanuts research.

During field research in September 2011 in Santa Cruz, due to road blocks and widespread protests over a government plan to build a road through protected lands, the research team was temporarily cut off and had to return to La Paz earlier than expected during a two-day temporary standstill of the protests. Fortunately, researchers had been ahead of schedule and were able to obtain more than 100 interviews per product during another field visit.

Limitations

The study was not designed to be nationally representative in a statistically significant sense, and no claims are made for it in this regard. The ILO has recently noted the numerous difficulties associated with meaningful sampling of populations potentially involved in forced labor.⁸⁵

A key limitation of this study was its reliance on a non-probability sample. While efforts were made by researchers to get a cross section of worksites and categories of workers, non-random sampling methods were used in the selection of both interviewees and research sites, and sample sizes were basically arbitrary. A key limitation of convenience sampling is that the most “hidden” or hard to access workers may be those who are most vulnerable to forced labor conditions.

Women and children, in particular, were undersampled in the research due to cultural restrictions on engaging with researchers, although data were collected from men about their families, partially offsetting this limitation. The research was importantly limited by the inability to conduct open, private and unhindered interviews with some categories of workers due to security concerns and impediments to access.

The study of cattle, corn, and peanuts was focused in the Chaco region because of the existing reports of forced labor in this region and because of the budget limitations that precluded the extension of the study to other regions where cattle, corn, and peanuts are produced. Therefore, the study of cattle, corn, and peanuts is only applicable to the Chaco region and cannot be considered to be representative of the production of these goods throughout Bolivia.

Research Findings

The categories for indicators of forced labor are based upon the ILO's guidance on "Identifying Forced Labor in Practice," which are broken down into lack of consent and menace of penalty, as shown below.⁸⁶ Information about wages and hours has also been included, as wage and hour violations may constitute indicators of forced labor. Although the presence of these indicators signals an increased risk for forced labor, each case must be assessed individually to determine the interplay of indicators and the context to determine whether or not it rises to the level of forced labor. The following findings are based on worker interviews, as well as researchers' direct observations, expert consultations, and a comprehensive literature review.⁸⁷

Box 1: Identifying forced labour in practice

Lack of consent to work (the "route into" forced labour)

- Birth/descent into "slave" or bonded status
- Physical abduction or kidnapping
- Sale of person into the ownership of another
- Physical confinement in the work location – in prison or in private detention
- Psychological compulsion, i.e. an order to work, backed up by a credible threat of a penalty for non-compliance
- Induced indebtedness (by falsification of accounts, inflated prices, reduced value of goods or services produced, excessive interest charges, etc.)
- Deception or false promises about types and terms of work
- Withholding and non-payment of wages
- Retention of identity documents or other valuable personal possessions

Menace of a penalty (the means of keeping someone in forced labour)

- Physical violence against worker or family or close associates
- Sexual violence
- (Threat of) supernatural retaliation
- Imprisonment or other physical confinement
- Financial penalties
- Denunciation to authorities (police, immigration, etc.) and deportation
- Exclusion from future employment
- Exclusion from community and social life
- Removal of rights or privileges
- Deprivation of food, shelter or other necessities
- Shift to even worse working conditions
- Loss of social status

Brazil-Nuts-Demographic Characteristics

In this study on the working conditions and indicators of forced labor in Brazil-nut production in the Amazon region of Bolivia, researchers implemented more than 300 surveys, which yielded 273 valid surveys after evaluation of the data.

Gender

Of the 273 workers surveyed, 96 (35 percent) were female respondents and 177 (65 percent) were male. Most Brazil-nut harvesters were male, indigenous heads of household who come from the *campesino* (peasant) class. In the interviews, male harvesters answered questions about their wives or partners who also worked in the harvest. However, the majority of factory workers in the Brazil-nut processing facilities were women and the sampling system took this into account.

Age

The average age of male and female workers was 37. Workers were generally young due to the extreme nature of work in the jungle and the long hours in factories, which require physical strength and endurance.

Seven workers under 18 were surveyed, comprising three percent of workers interviewed. However, by collecting information from adults working alongside minors, the researchers were able to verify that 133 minors were working with their parents or guardians, including 14 children under six years of age, 75 children between seven and 14 years of age, and 44 minors between the ages of 15 and 18.

Marital Status

The rate of legal marriage in the Amazon region is low. Therefore, researchers sought to find out the percentage of workers who were either married or in stable relationships (in which they shared a home and expenses). Of the 273 workers surveyed, 201 (74 percent) reported being married or in stable relationships.

Children

Of the 273 respondents 200 (73 percent) reported that they had children, approximately equivalent to the number reporting that they were married or in stable relationships. Workers' families were large and on average, each worker surveyed had seven children.

Education

The educational level of workers surveyed was low. On average, surveyed workers had completed only four years of schooling. This correlates with a high rate of illiteracy.

Language and Ethnicity

All respondents spoke Spanish, which shows a high degree of Hispanization of the population. However 76 (28 percent) of respondents were bilingual and were from a number of ethnic groups. One worker surveyed reported that he was Esse Ejja, another was Chácobo, and 23 (eight percent) were Tacanas. Workers from the Cavineños and Machineris ethnic groups were not interviewed. Furthermore, researchers interviewed three Quechua workers from the intramontane valleys, and eight Aymara workers from the Andes, which demonstrates migration from the highlands to the Amazonian region.

Employment Status

All workers interviewed involved in Brazil-nut harvesting were temporary, with contracts lasting only as long as the three to four month harvest. In the Brazil-nut processing plants about 24 percent of workers interviewed were permanent workers, while the remaining 76 percent are temporary workers. Of the 76 percent of temporary workers, more than 70 percent consisted of the pod breakers (*quebradoras*) - women in charge of breaking and removing the hard pod of the Brazil-nut and exposing the kernel which is the edible and exportable product. These temporary female laborers work an average of three months in the processing plants.

Brazil-Nuts-Privacy and Credibility

Of the 273 workers surveyed, 148 (55 percent) were carried out in private. For the remaining 45 percent, there were bystanders, including family members or neighbors who were also workers and who sometimes contributed to the interview by supporting or complementing what the interviewee said, but this could also have introduced some bias. Workers were generally comfortable and outgoing. However, in a few cases, the fear of being involved in the most serious allegations of exploitation made workers more reserved, and in two cases workers displayed evident and severe intimidation.

Brazil-Nuts-Presence of Indicators of Forced labor

Lack of consent to (involuntary nature of) work, (the “route into” forced labor)

Birth/Descent into “Slave” or Bonded Status

No evidence was obtained regarding the existence of people who were born into bondage and slavery in the Brazil-nut industry.

Physical Confinement in the Work Location

Of the 273 respondents, 69 (25 percent) stated they did not feel free to leave their workplace. Forty-seven workers (17 percent) reported that they were denied leave, including both harvesters and factory workers. In addition, 27 workers (20 percent), all of whom were harvesters, reported being confined in inaccessible places or having no money to pay for transportation to leave. The average traveling time from the harvest areas to the closest rural communities that had very basic services was 82 hours by a combination of different means of transportation (by foot, on motorcycle, and by boat). Generally, transport is paid for by the employer at the beginning and ending of the harvest, but workers who want to leave early must pay for their own transportation, which is very expensive. One respondent interviewed reported that he had fled his workplace. There have been reports of Brazil-nut workers being confined in very remote areas that take 15 days to reach by boat, which the researchers could not reach for security and logistical reasons.

Psychological Compulsion, i.e. an Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat of a Penalty for Non-compliance

Sixty-seven workers (25 percent) reported death threats against themselves or family members who said they wanted to leave. Forty-four workers (16 percent) reported threats of physical abuse, including sexual abuse against the worker or his/her partner or daughters. Many of the indebted workers reported that they were afraid that they would be asked to stay at the *barraca* until they finished paying off their debt or that if they failed to pay off their debt, their property could be confiscated. In addition, 107 workers (39 percent) reported fear of expulsion from their community and 73 workers (44 percent) reported that they were afraid of not being hired for the following harvest.

Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Extortionate Increase in Prices, Reduction in the Value of Goods Harvested or Services Rendered, or Excessive Interest Charged)

Many self-employed indigenous and peasant Brazil-nut harvesters contact a Brazil-nut broker (*rescatador*) who acts indirectly as an employer because he provides harvesters with working capital in the form of food, supplies, and tools. These products, known as the "*habilito*," are provided throughout the three to four months of the harvest and the

price the *rescatador* sets is considerably higher than what the goods cost at the Riberalta market. The workers must repay their debt with Brazil-nuts, at prices set by the *rescatador* at the beginning of the harvest, even if this price is lower than what they would receive on the open market, which it usually is. Some individuals may pay the debt with cash generated from other sources or they may remain indebted until the next harvest.

A *habilito* may also be given to an indigenous community or peasant *sindicato* (community collective, not a union), which then becomes indebted to the *rescatador*. The workers or community must repay their debt with the Brazil-nuts that they harvest. The price is set by the lender at the beginning of the harvest and is usually lower than what the harvesters would receive on the open market. There are also reports of fraud in the measurement of the quantity of Brazil-nuts harvested. If the value of Brazil-nuts collected by a community is not sufficient to pay the debt, the debt is carried over to the next harvest season.

Salaried workers are also provided with a *habilito* by business owners, which they must pay back by harvesting Brazil-nuts. Business owners either own stores themselves, or have arrangements with purveyors in Riberalta to obtain the necessary food, tools, and supplies for Brazil-nut harvesters. The business owners involved in the harvest of Brazil-nuts include landowners, landowners who also own Brazil-nut processing plants, and *barraca* managers. Every worker is “an account holder” (“*propietario de cuenta*”). The *barraca* manager pays for the transportation and *habilito* of all “account holders” and adult assistants, who depend on the delivery of this *habilito* to survive in the isolated areas in which they work. The record of the products delivered to the account holder is kept by the manager and the prices he sets for the *habilito* can be changed throughout the harvest. The Brazil-nuts with which account holders must pay back their debt are measured using standardized wooden boxes called *barricas*, which in many cases are overfilled so workers are underpaid.

If harvesters are unable to pay back their loans, they become indebted to the *rescatador* or the *barraca* or factory owner who hired them. To repay this debt, workers may be retained in the *barraca* doing maintenance work, transporting Brazil-nuts, or in other types of agriculture or forestry work. Earnings are withheld until the debt is paid, and workers often take on additional debt for food, supplies, and tools during this time. This can result in a cycle of debt, especially when the worker has his family living with him, and harvesters are often unable to repay their debt in full.

Harvesters who are unable to pay off their debt by harvesting Brazil-nuts may pay off their debt in other ways. For example, the debt of harvesters who are indebted to a *barraca* owner may be “bought” by a factory owner who must pay them back with factory work. If workers are not able to repay their debts, they may risk losing the *habilito* for the next harvest, thus endangering their livelihoods. Workers who fail to pay back the loans may be blacklisted, have their property confiscated or may be subjected to physical or sexual violence, which often goes unpunished due to a lack of authorities in remote areas. In more severe cases, harvesters pay their debt with property, such as

a motorcycle. There have also been reports of creditors violently taking workers' property.

Indebtedness can also be found in Brazil-nut processing factories. *Quebradores/as* (who break open the Brazil-nut shells) and sorters are generally women who work at the factories and receive a piece rate. Many of these workers are also account holders who must pay off their debt through their work. By becoming an account holder, these workers have access to a factory store, which is owned by the plant owner or by someone with whom the plant owner has an agreement. These workers can then receive products from the store on credit against their future earnings. They are only paid in cash once they have paid off their debt. In some cases, they can request an advance that is deducted from their income. These systems result in a cycle of debt and a reduction in workers' earnings due to inflated prices for the goods that they receive and the low prices that they receive for their Brazil-nuts.

Of the 273 workers interviewed, 170 (62 percent) stated they had borrowed money through the *habilito* system or to pay fees to obtain their jobs. Fifteen workers (five percent) reported being charged interest for cash loans. In one case, a worker who borrowed money from a friend (who was not his employer) paid 30 percent annual interest. When the loan was for the *habilito*, there was no interest, with the lender's income coming from over-charging for the products provided to the workers and from the low price paid for the Brazil-nuts collected or processed. The collateral for loans includes the confiscation of workers' identity cards (*carnets de identidad*), a co-signer, and workers' property. Four percent of workers interviewed reported that they had to give their identity cards to their lender as collateral, which would only be returned when they paid back their loans. In addition, 148 workers (54 percent) reported having to hand over their identity cards to their lender, who made a copy and gave back the cards.

Of the 74 salaried Brazil-nut harvesters surveyed, 72 (97 percent) reported that they had become indebted because at the start of the harvest they receive the *habilito* in the form of food, products, and tools that their employer provided to them, their families, and dependents. The cost of these supplies is considered to be a debt, which the workers must pay off with Brazil-nuts. The price that the employer will pay for the Brazil-nuts is stipulated in the employment contract (written or verbal), or is assessed by the employer at the time of payment. Sixty-three (85 percent) of the salaried harvesters interviewed reported not receiving a written contract. Therefore, these workers had no written guarantee of the price they would be paid for the Brazil-nuts that they harvested. In many cases, harvesters did not keep a record of the amount of debt owed and lenders, who control the accounts, exercise final authority regarding the amounts owed and the prices to be paid for the Brazil-nuts.

Of the 22 permanent factory workers interviewed, 18 (82 percent) reported that they were indebted. In the case of permanent factory workers, employers had an arrangement with or owned a store from which the worker purchased goods, with the cost of these items being deducted from their wages. Of the 70 temporary factory

workers surveyed, 54 (77 percent) reported that their employer had an arrangement with or owned a store from which the worker could get products to be charged to “their account.”

Of 273 workers surveyed, 154 (56 percent) reported being indebted at the end of the harvest or period of industrial processing of Brazil-nuts in the factories. In these cases, payments are deferred until the next harvest, covered by earnings from future earnings from their factory job, by earnings from other jobs, or through work in other activities for the same employer.

Deception or False Promises about Types and Terms of Work

Out of 273 workers interviewed, 82 workers (30 percent) reported that they were recruited by a labor broker. None of these workers reported signing a contract with the broker. Seventy-four workers (26 percent) reported that they signed a contract directly with the employer. Of the workers interviewed who reported that they signed employment contracts, 82 percent reported that information on their rights and obligations or working conditions was not included.

All first year harvesters interviewed reported false promises about the amount of money that they would earn during the harvest season and all factory workers interviewed reported false promises of the amount that they would earn, due to unrealistic production quotas. Eighty-five percent of workers (232) reported deception in the weighing of Brazil-nuts harvested or peeled. All 273 harvesters reported a failure to inform workers about extra tasks that they would have to carry out, such as transporting Brazil-nuts or building *payoles* (huts).

Withholding and Non-payment of Wages

An account holder is the person who gets paid for the volume of Brazil-nuts harvested/peeled or processed and who takes out loans and advances. Almost all workers interviewed were either “account holders,” or were dependents of an account holder. All harvesters interviewed reported that their earnings were retained during the three or four month harvest and they received advances on their wages through the *habilito*. At the end of the harvest, the difference between the amount of money that they earned and the amount that was advanced to them is calculated. If their earnings are more than their advances, they are owed money. When harvesters are owed money at the end of the harvest season, their payments are often withheld until the Brazil-nuts have been sold, which can take from one to three months and sometimes even longer.

In the case of factory workers, the amount of workers' debt, or the amount owed to workers is tallied on a monthly basis. Factory workers may have their payments withheld as a credit against which they can continue to receive goods from factory stores or they may be paid in cash at the end of the month.

Of the 273 respondents interviewed, 59 (22 percent), all of whom had kept accounts of their debt and money owed to them, reported being dissatisfied with the payment systems. However, they reported not complaining for fear of not being hired for the next harvest, or for fear of being fired from processing plants. The rest of the respondents did not know whether their accounting of their payments and debts was correct or not because they did not, or were unable to, keep track of their amount of debt and earnings.

Retention of Identity Documents or Other Valuable Personal Effects

Of the 273 workers interviewed, 148 (54 percent) reported providing their identity cards to money lenders, so that they could be copied and immediately returned to them. In addition, 11 workers (four percent) reported that their identity cards were obtained by money lenders as collateral for cash loans and were not returned until they paid back the debt.

Menace of a Penalty (the Means of Keeping Someone in Forced Labor) - Actual Presence or Credible Threat:

General

Forty-seven (17 percent) of the 273 respondents did not feel free to leave their place of work. Of these workers, 20 (seven percent) were denied permission to leave and 27 (ten percent) reported being unable to leave due to lack of transportation or money, as they were extremely isolated.

Of the 273 workers interviewed, 204 (75 percent) reported that they could freely quit their jobs. However, 169 workers interviewed (62 percent) reported that they did not feel free to quit their jobs because they had debts that they were required to pay. In one case, a worker was forcibly detained with the use of violence and had to escape.

Physical Violence against Workers, against Their Family or People Close to Them

Sixty-seven workers (25 percent of all interviewed workers) reported the presence of armed guards at the processing plants, or that the *barraca* manager was armed. Sixty-seven workers (25 percent) reported death threats against themselves or their family members. Forty-four workers (16 percent) reported threats of physical abuse, including sexual abuse against the worker or to his/her partner or daughters. Twenty-one workers (eight percent) reported being subjected to severe verbal abuse. Twenty-three workers (eight percent) reported being beaten or seeing another worker beaten in their presence.

Twenty-two harvesters interviewed (30 percent) reported that the *barraca* manager was armed, and felt that he used his weapon as a means of coercion. Fourteen harvesters reported that a *barraca* manager had threatened to kill them with a weapon.

Sexual Violence

Ten workers (four percent) reported that they were aware of workers who had been forced to have sex at work. This was most prevalent among female cooks who worked for the *barraca* managers. Female harvesters and factory workers are frequently subjected to sexual harassment and in some cases sexual abuse by their co-workers.

(Threat of) Supernatural Retaliation

The animistic religion followed by some inhabitants of the Amazonian region of Bolivia creates conditions conducive to the threat of supernatural retaliation. However, the researchers were unable to obtain data on the frequency of threats of supernatural retaliation. The most common threats of supernatural retaliation involve emotional blackmail in the context of the *compadrazgo* relationship, in which there is a veiled threat of supernatural punishment for not obeying a godfather or godmother who forces the godson or goddaughter to work. Another threat of supernatural retaliation involves the threat of death by being “swallowed” by the jungle and disappearing during the harvest. This fear is generated by fostering suspicions that missing workers were “swallowed” by the jungle for misbehaving or disobeying their bosses.

Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement

Thirty-nine workers (14 percent) revealed that due to the extreme isolation in which they worked, they were “abandoned” in the jungle for over a month and in some cases throughout the harvest, without any means of transport available for them to leave.

Financial Penalties

No financial penalties were reported.

Dismissal from Work

Of the 92 factory workers interviewed, eleven workers (four percent) reported being threatened with dismissal as a means of coercion.

Exclusion from Future Employment

Fifty workers (18 percent) reported the use of blacklists as a means of punishment. Of all the 166 salaried workers interviewed, 73 (44 percent) reported that exclusion from hiring for the following harvest or factory production season was used as a means of coercion.

Exclusion from Community and Social Life

Of the 273 workers interviewed, 107 (39 percent) reported that expulsion from their community was used as a threat. Although workers reported that they feared expulsion

from the community for failure to harvest enough Brazil-nuts, the researchers found no cases in which community members were expelled from their communities solely for failing to harvest enough Brazil-nuts. The researchers did interview two workers who had been expelled from their communities, but their offenses included a failure to harvest enough Brazil-nuts, as well as other offenses such as carrying out crimes. This issue is present mostly among peasants and indigenous groups, for whom survival depends on the inclusion and support of their communities, but was also reported among peasant workers who were members of “*sindicatos*” (community collectives that harvest Brazil-nuts, “not unions”).

Expulsion from a community means the loss of workers' homes, social networks, livelihoods and land. Indigenous leaders establish a series of rules and obligations for members of the community. These are unwritten rules because the indigenous languages are not written languages, but the rules are clearly communicated to all members of the community. Among the obligations is that community members engage in productive activities, including harvesting Brazil-nuts. The failure to meet these obligations can result in punishments, the most serious of which is expulsion from the community. Indigenous leaders sometimes make agreements with businesses to deliver a certain amount of Brazil-nuts in exchange for a certain amount of *habilito* or an amount of money to be paid upon delivery of the Brazil-nuts. This *habilito* or money is distributed among community members according to the needs of each family. As indigenous communities are able to sustain themselves in the jungle, they do not depend on the *habilito* as much as peasant settlers, although this is changing due to an increased demand for consumer goods. In many cases, each head of household is assigned a certain amount of Brazil-nuts that they must harvest.

Peasants harvest Brazil-nuts on their own parcels of land. *Rescatadores* give the *habilito* to individuals, but there are also *sindicatos* (community collectives) of peasant workers who take out a collective contract to deliver a certain amount of Brazil-nuts for a *habilito*, which is distributed among community members. In this case, each head of household is assigned a certain amount of Brazil-nuts to harvest and *sindicato* members reported that they could be expelled from the *sindicato* if they failed to do so. If peasant workers are expelled from the *sindicato* they lose their right to their land. If a worker gives their Brazil-nuts to an individual buyer instead of the *sindicato* they can be forced to buy this quantity of Brazil-nuts and provide it to the *sindicato* or they can be forced to do community service (construction of schools or docks, cleaning of paths, or to be an “attendant” during community *fiestas*-which is the lowest position in the social hierarchy).

Removal of Rights or Privileges

Workers reported that their land rights could be lost due to a failure to harvest a certain amount of Brazil-nuts (see *Exclusion from community and social life* above).

Deprivation of Food, Shelter or Other Necessities

As harvesters were extremely isolated and depended on their *rescatadores* and employers to provide them with food and supplies through the *habilito*, there was inherently a menace of penalty of deprivation of food and supplies. In addition, workers who failed to pay back their loans or who complained were not provided with the *habilito* the next year and there were many reports of formal and informal blacklists of these workers that were circulated amongst *rescatadores* and employers. For many workers, the *habilito* comprises a key source of food that allows them to survive during the harvest season, and although it is a repressive system, the threat of deprivation of the *habilito* constitutes a menace of penalty.

Shift to Even Worse Working Conditions

Seventy workers (26 percent) reported that they had to keep working to pay their debt after the harvest season ended by maintaining the *barraca* facilities or working as Brazil-nut transporters. These workers reported experiencing worse working conditions and that they were paid a daily wage that was much less than what they made per day during the harvest season. Additionally, they continued to receive food, tools, and supplies in the form of a *habilito* so their debt continued to increase. The most frequent activities included cleaning the *barracas*; repairing the “*payoles*” (huts), rebuilding docks, clearing the paths that lead into the jungle for Brazil-nut harvesting, and repairing, building, or clearing the roads for tractors, trucks, and motorcycles.

Loss of Social Status

Workers reported that they could be forced to carry out community service, including socially demeaning work as “attendants” at community *fiestas* if they failed to provide their *sindicatos* (community collectives) with a certain amount of Brazil-nuts (see *Exclusion from community and social life* above).

Wages and Hours

Wages

Of the 273 workers interviewed, 137 workers (50 percent) reported receiving in kind payments of food, tools, and supplies instead of cash. Self-employed harvesters earned an average of BOB 2,416 (USD 350) per month during the harvest; factory workers earned an average of BOB 653 (USD 96) per month; and salaried harvesters earned an average of BOB 500 (USD 74) per month. Although self-employed harvesters earned a higher amount than other workers, they had no work in many cases for four to nine months of the year (during the down season). Of the 273 workers interviewed, 195 (71 percent) earned less than the national minimum wage.

Working Hours

The Brazil-nut harvest in the Amazon jungle is comprised of three months of intensive tasks and another month for the harvest of leftover Brazil-nuts. This means the workload is concentrated in three to four months, leaving between eight and nine months of unemployment. During the harvest, work takes place from sun-up to sun-down (6:00 am to 7:00 pm) and the extraction of the Brazil-nut seed by splitting the pods can last until 9:00 or 10:00 pm. This represents up to 16 hours of work per day, with an average of ten hours per day.

Brazil-nut processing consists of washing, boiling, shelling or peeling, and packing Brazil-nuts for export. Processing is a year-long process, with six months of intensive work, three months of moderate work, and a remaining three months of reduced work. Brazil-nut industrial processing plants typically remain active from 4:00 am to 10:00 pm, for 18 hours of continuous activity. During these 18 hours, female workers rotate in shifts doing piecework. Consequently, the amount of time that they stay in the plant can vary significantly. During the high season, they can work up to 15 hours per day, with a short half-hour meal break. During the low season, work does not exceed four to five hours per day. Throughout the year, processing plant workers average about ten hours of work per day. During periods of intensive work, there is no weekly day of rest for harvesters or processing plant workers.

Brazil-Nuts-Other Issues of Concern

Benefits

None of the harvesters interviewed received any of the benefits to which they were legally entitled. Of the 92 factory workers interviewed, 83 (90 percent) reported that they received a Christmas bonus (*Aguinaldo*); 40 (43 percent) received health insurance; 13 (14 percent) received maternity leave and a breast feeding bonus; 47 (51 percent) received vacation time; and 23 (25 percent) received pay for overtime worked, but that they did not receive an overtime premium.

Health and Safety

Workers face serious hazards to their health and safety in Brazil-nut harvesting, ranging from the existence of serious endemic consumptive diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, to work-related accidents such as Brazil-nut pods falling from the trees onto workers, poisonous animal bites, machete injuries, motorcycle and outboard motor canoe accidents while transporting Brazil-nuts, and injuries from carrying heavy bags of Brazil-nuts.

In the processing plants, the greatest health and safety threat facing workers was heat exhaustion and dehydration due to the high temperatures in the factories. Moreover, workers reported a lack of medical services for a large majority of workers.

Fifty-six (21 percent) of the 273 workers interviewed reported having been hurt or sick during the work season. Thirty-nine workers (14 percent) received some form of medical care and 23 workers (59 percent of these workers) reported paying for their medical care.

Discrimination

Fifty-six workers (20 percent of all workers interviewed) reported discrimination, including the use of blacklists to discriminate against workers who were fired for complaining about payment calculations, demanding better working conditions, or for participating in union leadership posts, among other causes.

Gender-based discrimination was also reported, as only male harvesters are considered account holders. Only eight female account holders were found by researchers, all of whom had inherited the accounts and debts of male relatives or partners who had died or had abandoned them. In factories, it was reported that men were generally not contracted as *quebradoras* due to perceptions that women worked harder due to family obligations.

Living Conditions

Harvesters build their own dwellings. These workers generally live in huts made out of stick walls, with palm frond roofs and dirt floors. The huts have no electricity or running water. Factory workers generally build their own *barriadas*, which have palm frond or corrugated sheet metal roofs.

Food during the harvest is provided through the *habilito* system, by which employer representatives deliver uncooked staples to workers, to be paid with the Brazil-nuts collected. The pricing of these products is highly variable. Factory workers are not provided with food by employers; however, there are private suppliers that operate around, and in some cases inside, the plants, which provide food for cash or deferred payment through an arrangement between the private supplier and the factory owner.

Transportation

Brazil-nut harvesters are transported by trucks, carts pulled by tractors, motorcycles, canoes, and boats. The average travel time from workers' communities to the *barracas* was 82 hours. Twenty-nine (11 percent) of workers reported that transport by motorcycle is dangerous.

Child Labor

As Brazil-nut harvesting is carried out by entire families, child labor is extremely common. Ninety-one (33 percent) of respondents used one or more family members as helpers, including 14 children under six years of age, 75 minors between seven and 14 years of age, and 44 child workers between the ages of 15 and 18. Generally, boys above the age of 12 go with their fathers to harvest Brazil-nuts in the jungle, while girls over 12 help their mothers open the pods. Harvesting can be hazardous, as children carry bags of Brazil-nuts weighing up to 40 kilograms (and more when they are wet from rain), heavy Brazil-nut pods can fall on children's heads, they can be bitten by poisonous snakes and spiders, and may get lost in the jungle. There are also risks for girls involved with cutting open Brazil-nut pods with a machete. Both boys and girls work in high temperatures of up to 104 degrees Fahrenheit for 12 to 14 hours per day, sometimes under torrential rain. While children under 12 are generally not given machetes and are not brought under the Brazil-nut trees to harvest nuts, they may help with light work. Tasks do not vary greatly depending on age among children above the age of 12, but the quantity of work does vary according to age.

Despite restrictions recently introduced by some processing plants, researchers found that children also worked in Brazil-nut processing factories. Research uncovered evidence that factories sometimes hired children to work at night in order to avoid child labor inspections and sanctions. Although rare, there was a risk of these children losing their fingers in machines that break open the Brazil-nuts.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Demographic Characteristics

In this study of the working conditions and indicators of forced labor in the production of cattle, corn, and peanuts in the Bolivian Chaco, more than 750 responses yielded 601 valid surveys, including 537 valid surveys for corn production, 278 for peanut production, and 233 for cattle production. Given that a single worker can work in the production of two or more products, a single survey could provide information for more than one product. For a chart of demographic characteristics and research findings broken down by product, see *Appendix 9: Chart of Findings by Product*.

Gender

Of the 601 workers interviewed whose surveys were judged to be valid, 253 (42 percent) were female and 348 (58 percent) were males. Most of the workers who granted interviews were heads of household who answered questions about their wives or partners who also worked on the family plot or the *hacienda*.

Age

The average age of male and female workers was 43. The respondents included 15 workers under the age of 18 (two percent of workers interviewed), one of whom was younger than eight years-old, three who were 13 years-old, three who were 15 years-old, three who were 16 years-old, one was 17 years-old, and four who did not specify their ages but were clearly under 18.

Marital Status

Of the 601 workers surveyed, 396 (66 percent) reported being married or in a stable relationship and 103 workers (17 percent) did not provide information about whether they were married or in a stable relationship.

Children

Of the 601 workers interviewed, 225 (37 percent) reported that they had children; 103 workers (17 percent) did not provide information about whether they had children. On average, both male and female workers had three children.

Education

Of the 601 workers interviewed, 132 (22 percent) reported that they had no education; 343 (57 percent) had attained a fifth grade education; 49 (eight percent) had completed some level of secondary education; 36 (six percent) had graduated from secondary school; and nine (one percent) had attained some degree of higher education.

Language and Ethnicity

Of the 537 corn producers interviewed, 450 (84 percent) spoke Spanish. Of the 537 corn producers, 452 (84 percent) spoke Guaraní as their first language, of whom 376 (70 percent) spoke Guaraní and Spanish and 76 (14 percent) only spoke Guaraní. In addition, eight of the 537 corn producers (two percent) spoke Weenhayek as their first language and 32 (six percent) spoke Quechua as their first language. Of the 537 corn producers interviewed, 452 (84 percent) identified themselves as Guaraní, eight as Weenhayek (two percent), 32 (six percent) as Quechua, and 45 (eight percent) as *mestizos*. The ethnic and linguistic breakdowns were similar for cattle and peanuts.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Privacy and Credibility

Of 601 worker interviews, 420 (70 percent) took place in private and 177 (29 percent) in the presence of others, usually family members. The credibility of the informants was judged as being high.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor

Lack of Consent to (Involuntary Nature of) Work (the “Route into” Forced Labor)

Birth/Descent into “Slave” or Bonded Status

Research indicates that in the past it was common for generations of workers to be born into bondage. During research activities, there were reports of this occurring on only two *haciendas*, one in Huacareta and another in Alto Parapetí. Researchers attempted to talk to workers at these *haciendas*, but these workers were not allowed to talk to outsiders.

Physical Confinement in the Work Location

Of the 601 workers interviewed, 26 (four percent) stated they were not allowed to leave their workplace. Key informants interviewed at the end of research activities reported that there were groups of workers who were forcibly taken and confined in *haciendas* in other regions, such as northern Santa Cruz and Beni, but because those areas were not included in the original scope of the study and the time scheduled for research activities ran out, Verité could not corroborate these allegations.

Hacienda workers and self-employed workers lack access to public transport. While isolation of *haciendas* was an issue of concern in the past, it is less of an issue now, but the isolation of self-employed indigenous producers is still very severe. In some cases, trucks arrive in isolated indigenous communities only at the time of harvest or to bring in seeds and supplies. Twelve workers interviewed reported access to transportation once a month in their communities; five reported that transportation came “once in a while;” and four reported that no vehicles ever entered their community because there was not a road to their communities. Other workers interviewed had more regular access to transportation.

Psychological Compulsion, i.e. an Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat of a Penalty for Non-compliance

Twenty-three percent of workers interviewed (139) reported that they were indebted to their employers, many of whom reported that they were concerned that they would be asked to stay at the farm until they paid off the debt and would not be able to go back to their land or work somewhere else.

Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Extortionate Increase in Prices, Reduction in the Value of Goods Harvested or Services Rendered, or Excessive Interest Charged)

Of the 601 workers interviewed, 139 (23 percent) reported having been indebted to their employers at some time, with higher rates of indebtedness among salaried workers. Fifty-five of the 140 salaried corn workers interviewed (39 percent) reported that they were indebted; 40 of the 102 salaried peanut workers (39 percent) reported that they were indebted; and 39 of the 100 salaried cattle workers interviewed (39 percent) reported that they had to borrow money. This was about double the rate of indebtedness compared to self-employed workers (20 percent for self-employed cattle and corn producers and 18 percent for self-employed peanut producers).

Employers provided salaried workers with advances of money and supplies, resulting in indebtedness. Among *hacienda* employees, the average debt was estimated at BOB 300 (USD 45). Fifty-five workers interviewed (ten percent of the 601 workers interviewed) reported that they were paid some or all of their wages in food. Workers reported that employers inflated the prices of goods that they provided to workers, especially food, as many workers were unaware of market prices. Also, due to workers' low educational levels, they depended on employers for payment and debt calculations. Twenty-six workers (five percent of the 601 workers interviewed) reported that they were under a permanent obligation to work for their employer because they were never able to earn enough to pay off their debt. Salaried workers reported that some or all of their wages were withheld and that they could not leave their employer without paying back their debt, which affected both workers and their families.

Of the 79 self-employed cattle, corn, and peanut workers interviewed, 12 (15 percent) reported that they had become indebted during the previous year. Some self-employed workers did not have the seeds, fertilizer, or tools that they needed to carry out their work. Therefore, *rescatadores* and *hacienda* owners provided them with these products at inflated prices. The producers had to pay back these in-kind loans with meat, milk, cheese, corn, or peanuts, the value of which was set by the lenders below market price. While interest was not charged, the lenders made money from the loans through their leverage in setting prices. In some cases, the producers had to pay back loans with work, and in other cases when they were not able to pay the debt, they were threatened with physical harm or the lenders confiscated pigs, chickens, or cattle. Indebted self-employed workers borrowed an average of BOB 6,000 (USD 882) in products per year. Self-employed workers who failed to pay back their loans were unable to take out additional loans, which negatively affected their families.

Deception or False Promises about Types and Terms of Work

Thirty six salaried workers (46 percent of the 79 salaried workers interviewed) reported that they felt deceived because promises made at the time of hiring were not fulfilled. This deception involved promises about the provision of food or coca leaves as part of the payment and the time required to perform the tasks that workers were contracted to

carry out. Workers also reported that payments were withheld until the tasks were completed and that they were not allowed to use assigned pieces of land to grow subsistence crops.

By Decree, servitude was abolished and landowners are required to pay workers the wages that they should have been paid while they were in servitude as well as an indemnity (see Appendix 2: *Legal Framework*). In some cases, employers promised to pay workers in land rather than in cash, as the amount owed can be very large. There were cases in which workers reported that they stayed on the *haciendas* and continued working due to false promises that they would be paid in cash or land. Of the 61 *haciendas* visited for in-depth research, 45 were found to still have salaried workers living on them.

Withholding and Non-payment of Wages

Of the 601 workers interviewed, five workers (less than one percent) reported being charged for the use of their homes on the *haciendas*. In these cases, the workers were not paid in cash, but instead were provided with housing and food.

Workers who were indebted to their employer had either all or part of their wages withheld as payment for their debts until they had paid off their debts. Workers paid by the task had all of their payment withheld until the completion of the task, or were paid an advance at the beginning of the task and the balance upon completion.

As mentioned in the *Deception or false promises about types and terms of work* section above, many workers were owed money for past uncompensated work which went unpaid.

Retention of Identity Documents / Valuable Personal Effects

There were no reported cases of retention of identity documents or other valuable personal effects.

Menace of Penalty (the Means of Keeping Someone in Forced Labor) - Actual Presence or Credible Threat:

General

Twenty-six workers (four percent of the 601 workers interviewed) did not feel free to leave their workplace. None of the indebted workers interviewed reported that they could leave their place of work without having paid their debt.

Physical Violence against Workers, against Their Family or People Close to Them

Of the 601 workers interviewed, 33 (six percent) reported that they were threatened,

insulted, or physically attacked. Twelve workers interviewed (two percent of the 601 workers interviewed) reported that they were fearful of being physically harmed in the workplace; 21 (four percent) reported being threatened with physical violence; and four workers (less than one percent) reported that their bosses had been physically aggressive with them.

Sexual Violence

Four case studies revealed sexual harassment and abuse on the *haciendas*. These cases involved girls and young women who were hired as domestic servants in the houses of *patrons* or supervisors, who sexually abused them. However, there were indications that as captive workers were increasingly being liberated, this type of sexual violence was becoming less and less common.

(Threat of) Supernatural Retaliation

There were no reported cases of threats of supernatural retaliation.

Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement

Physical confinement was a common practice on the *haciendas*. The researchers received reports of cases of severe physical isolation and confinement on two *haciendas*, but access to these *haciendas* was denied so the researchers were not able to verify these reports. However, workers interviewed did not report that imprisonment of physical confinement was used as a threat or penalty.

Financial Penalties

Researchers did not detect the use of financial penalties as a threat or means of punishment.

Dismissal from Work

Researchers did not detect the use of dismissal from work as a threat or means of punishment.

Exclusion from Future Employment

Researchers did not detect the use of exclusion from future employment as a threat or means of punishment.

Exclusion from Community and Social Life

Among the 83 indigenous self-employed workers interviewed, 100 percent reported that work was compulsory in their communities. According to the rules of indigenous communities, a person who does not work may be penalized, including with expulsion

from the community. Although these rules are not written because indigenous languages are not written languages, the rules are clearly communicated to all members of the community. Each year, indigenous workers are assigned a certain amount of land on which to plant corn and peanuts and/or are assigned a certain amount of time to work with cattle. They share the corn, peanuts, milk, cheese, and meat that are produced. Workers who fail to carry out this work may face the threat of expulsion from the community, which can mean the loss of their home, lands, jobs, and social networks.

Removal of Rights or Privileges

No cases or threats of removal of rights or privileges were reported.

Deprivation of Food, Shelter or Other Necessities

Workers interviewed did not report cases or threats of deprivation of food, shelter, or other necessities.

Shift to Even Worse Working Conditions

No cases or threats of shifts to even worse working conditions were reported.

Loss of Social Status

Among peasant self-employed workers who worked on communal lands, it was reported that those who did not work in corn, cattle, and peanut production could be assigned menial or demeaning tasks, such as being “attendants” during community *fiestas*, which denotes the lowest level of the social hierarchy.

Wages and Hours

Wages

Of the 601 workers interviewed, 595 (99 percent) earned less than the national minimum wage set for 2010 at BOB 679 (USD 99) per month. The severe degree of poverty observed among indigenous workers and peasants interviewed makes it evident that the payment they received for their work was much less than what was needed to cover their basic needs.

Seventy-three workers (12 percent of the 601 workers interviewed) received food as part of their salary. Workers who were provided with food were paid BOB 40 (USD 6) per day, while daily wages without food were BOB 50 (USD 7.30) to BOB 60 (USD 9) for eight to ten hour workdays.

Working Hours

Among workers interviewed, working hours averaged approximately 12 hours per day, six days a week. Animal husbandry demands daily work without rest.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Other Issues of Concern

Health and Safety

Health and safety conditions in the Chaco region were extremely poor, including the presence of endemic diseases such as severe consumptive malaria, tuberculosis, and Chagas disease. In the desert, bites from poisonous animals like snakes and scorpions were relatively frequent. However, most injuries came from workers being trapped in fires caused by the practice of slash and burn agriculture called *chaqueo*, which is used to clear and prepare agricultural land. Prolonged periods of drought make the brush extremely combustible. *Chaqueo* is carried out just before the first rains when the fire risk is at its highest. Social security and health insurance were not provided by employers.

Sixty-eight workers (11 percent of the 601 workers interviewed) reported that they or one of their coworkers had become ill or were injured on the job. Of these workers, 31 requested medical care, for which they paid an average of BOB 50 (USD 7).

Discrimination

Of the 601 workers interviewed, three workers (less than one percent) reported discrimination in hiring due to complaints about wages and differences in compensation.

Living Conditions

Of the 601 workers interviewed, five workers (less than one percent) reported being charged for the use of their homes on the *haciendas*. Seventy-three workers (12 percent of the 601 workers interviewed) received food as part of their salary.

Transportation

Most workers lived at their workplaces, so dangerous or cramped transportation was not an issue of concern.

Child Labor

Work in cattle, corn, and peanuts was generally carried out by the family unit, so child labor was extremely common. Of the 601 workers interviewed, 418 (67 percent) reported that they worked alongside their children and/or other family members under 18 years of age. Children as young as five helped in planting, tilling, harvesting, milking cows and making cheese. Fifteen (three percent) of the 601 workers interviewed were under the age of 18. Workers interviewed reported that minors (including their own children) helped them carry out their work, including 14 children under the age of five, 22 children between six and eight years of age, 112 children between the ages of nine and 13, and 129 children between 14 and 17 years of age.

Conclusions

This report has covered background information on Bolivia and the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Amazon and Chaco regions. The report also explains the methodology that was developed to study the presence of indicators of forced labor in these sectors, findings on the presence of indicators of forced labor and other labor violations, and the factors that increase workers' vulnerability to labor exploitation. These findings are not statistically representative of Bolivia or the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, or peanut sectors and this report does not claim to determine the existence or scale of forced labor in Bolivia. However, the report does provide an overview of the indicators of forced labor and other forms of labor exploitation uncovered amongst Brazil-nut workers in the Amazon region of Bolivia and cattle, corn, and peanut workers in the Chaco region of Bolivia, as well as factors that increase workers' vulnerability to labor exploitation.

Main Findings

Using ILO guidance on “Identifying forced labor in practice,” research detected evidence of the presence of the following indicators of lack of consent and menace of penalty, as well as other issues of concern.

Brazil-nuts in the Amazon Region

Lack of consent:

- physical confinement in the work location,
- psychological compulsion,
- induced indebtedness,
- deception or false promises about terms of work,
- withholding and non-payment of wages, and
- retention of identity documents.

Menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of):

- physical violence against workers,
- sexual violence,
- supernatural retaliation,
- physical confinement,
- dismissal from work,
- exclusion from future employment,
- exclusion from community and social life,
- removal of rights and privileges,
- deprivation of food,
- shift to even worse working conditions, and
- loss of social status.

Wages and hours:

- low wages,
- excessive working hours, and
- a lack of days off during peak periods.

Other issues of concern:

- serious hazards to workers' health and safety,
- discrimination,
- poor living conditions,
- dangerous transportation, and
- child labor.

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts in the Chaco Region

Lack of consent:

- physical confinement in the work location,
- psychological compulsion,
- induced indebtedness,
- deception or false promises about terms of work, and
- withholding and non-payment of wages.

Menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of):

- physical violence against workers,
- sexual violence, and
- loss of social status.

Other issues of concern:

- excessive working hours,
- a lack of days off for workers in animal husbandry,
- subminimum wages,
- serious hazards to workers' health and safety, and
- child labor.

Risk Factors

Risk factors were detected amongst Brazil-nut harvesters and factory workers in the Amazon region, including:

- harvesters reported high levels of extreme physical isolation, dependence on employers and *rescatadores* for food and transportation, and physical intimidation and threats;
- salaried harvesters reported a high level of indebtedness and a lack of written contracts; and
- factory workers (both permanent and temporary) reported high levels of indebtedness.

Risk factors were detected amongst salaried workers and indigenous and peasant self-employed workers in the cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Chaco region, including:

- salaried workers reported a high rate of indebtedness and deception about terms of work;
- indigenous self-employed workers reported compulsory work and expulsion from their communities for failing to carry out this work; and
- peasant self-employed workers reported that they could be assigned demeaning tasks for failing to carry out compulsory work.

Lessons Learned

Verité was presented with a series of challenges while carrying out research in Bolivia, which offered valuable lessons on ways to successfully carry out research in areas in which it is. Researchers faced unique challenges related to conducting research in Bolivia, including flooding, road blocks, a serious car accident, and a violent assault of the Research Coordinator. This research also exposed some of the challenges of conducting research on hidden populations and vulnerable workers. These challenges included the inability to randomly sample respondents due to the lack of a list of workers. In addition, factors that made workers more vulnerable to exploitation, such as fear and low levels of education, also made it difficult to obtain information from them. To overcome these challenges, researchers adopted a flexible research plan and used multiple sources of both quantitative and qualitative information to triangulate findings.

From these challenges, Verité learned that carrying out research in unstable countries with poor infrastructure creates unique challenges and that to overcome these challenges; a flexible research methodology, budget, and timeline must be used. Verité also learned that carrying out research in countries with large indigenous populations necessitates the use of indigenous researchers and contacts, both to understand the cultural context and to bridge the cultural gap and build confidence between non-indigenous researchers and the indigenous population.

Appendix 1: Land Redistribution in Bolivia

Laws on Land Redistribution

Supreme Decree 29802 of November 19, 2008 established the definition of servitude, forced labor, debt peonage, slavery, families in captivity, and practices analogous to slavery in the agricultural sector. It also empowers the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) to verify and determine the existence of forced labor. Servitude, forced labor, debt peonage, and/or enslavement of captive families is found to exist when communities, families, or individuals provide work or service on agricultural lands in violation of their fundamental rights, without their full consent, or when they are paid in kind or below the minimum wage. Supreme Decree 29802 also establishes that no debts accrued as a result of servitude, forced labor, peonage, slavery or captivity will be recognized.⁸⁸

The State recognizes communal or collective ownership of land; protects and guarantees the communal or collective property of peasant and indigenous communities; establishes that the people who work the land have the right to own it; establishes that lands must meet a social or economic function; and that state lands will be granted to peasants, indigenous, and Afro-Bolivian communities that do not own enough land in order to meet their needs.⁸⁹ The Autonomy and Decentralization Law (*Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización*) provided indigenous groups with land rights and the rights to autonomy and self-governance, including the regulation of working conditions in their areas of jurisdiction. In order to obtain land through government redistribution programs, Bolivians need to belong to an indigenous community to receive *tierras originarias* (ancestral lands) or to a group of peasant settlers to receive *tierras fiscales* (State lands). Expulsion from a community can thus mean the loss of workers' land rights.

With reference to the *saneamiento* (confiscation and redistribution) of agricultural property, the Constitution establishes that those who work the land have the right to ownership. Property owners must ensure that their lands contribute to social or economic development, including through the sustainable use of land by indigenous peoples and peasant indigenous communities, as well as the use of small properties as the source of the livelihood, welfare, and cultural development of its owners.⁹⁰ The regulation of land ownership is also governed by Law No. 1715 on the National Land Reform Service (*Servicio Nacional de la Reforma Agraria*) of October 18, 1996, which was amended by Law No. 3545 on Communitarian Renewal of Agrarian Reform (*Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria*) on November 28, 2006, which states that land must be used to serve a socio-economic function. Under the law, the process of *saneamiento* determines whether a property meets a Social Economic Function (*Función Económica Social – FES*); if it does not, INRA has the power to redistribute idle lands. Article 157 of Supreme Decree No. 29215 of August 2, 2007 states that forced labor is contrary to the common good and the land on which forced

laborers work fails to serve a socio-economic function. The Decree includes penalties, including jail sentences and land confiscation for subjecting workers to forced labor.

Conflicts over Land Redistribution

Amazon Region

In the Amazon region, land redistribution has resulted in a high degree of conflict between workers, local and national authorities, and land owners. In 2008, indigenous peoples, peasants, and representatives of the Pando Departmental Prefecture were murdered in what is known as the Massacre of Porvenir and Filadelfia.⁹¹ Labor relationships and working conditions have changed as a result. To be able to reconstruct these events, researchers gathered testimonies from witnesses, as well as trustworthy publicly available information.

In 2006, the new Constitution established the right to autonomous indigenous ownership of their ancestral lands. In order to comply with the Constitution, the National Government mandated the reorganization of lands under the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), which had been in charge of rural lands in Bolivia since 1953. CIDOB demanded compliance with the new Constitution and requested ownership of indigenous peoples' ancestral lands. In order to distribute these lands in Pando Department, INRA established a technical team in their offices in the Departmental capital, Cobija, on the northern border with Brazil.

Meanwhile, an opposition group formed in 2007, made up of a coalition called *Media Luna* (Half Moon) from five departments in Eastern Bolivia that form the lowlands opposition to the central government. Landowners and businessmen comprised this main opposition group that was resolutely against land redistribution. The group's leader in Pando was the Departmental Prefect, who was elected through a democratic vote and was the highest-ranking Departmental authority at the time.

There are two contradictory rumors about how the conflict began, neither of which has been confirmed. A rumor circulating among indigenous peoples and peasants is that the Prefect was going to seize the INRA offices in Cobija and expel their technicians in order to stop the land redistribution. Being aware of this, peasants and indigenous groups gathered in Riberalta to march to Cobija to protect the INRA offices from the Prefect. Another rumor circulating in the Departmental Prefecture in Cobija is that indigenous groups and peasants met in Riberalta and decided to march to Cobija to overthrow the Prefect and seize the Prefecture, so prefecture employees were sent to bring heavy machinery, including dump trucks and tractors, to “defend their jobs” and to “stop” the marchers.

It is clear that the marchers left from Riberalta, prefecture employees left from Cobija, and they met each other at Filadelfia and Porvenir. Both the marchers and prefecture

representatives reported that political activists, gunmen hired by landowners to stop the marchers, and members of the opposition infiltrated the lines of the Prefecture.

When both groups confronted each other between September 11 and 19, 2008, gunmen opened fire against the indigenous leaders.⁹² Some of the indigenous marchers were carrying hunting weapons and responded by shooting their guns. People fled into the jungle, where both marchers and prefecture officers were shot and killed by gunmen. The dead and wounded were thrown into the river. The United Nations has declared that the events that took place in Porvenir on September 11, 2008 were a massacre, in which 11 people were killed and 50 were injured, rather than an armed confrontation between the marchers and authorities. The UN placed responsibility for the massacre on the Prefecture and members of the Pando Civic Committee (*Comité Cívico Pandino*).⁹³

When informed of the massacre, a police force from Cobija was sent to stop it, but indigenous marchers fled due to mistrust of the authorities and did not cooperate with the police. The national government ordered the Prefect's capture and imprisonment and he was taken to the capital city of La Paz to prevent his followers from attempting to free him from the local jail. In 2012, he was still in prison and was being tried. The President replaced the Prefect with an authority linked to the national government. The INRA's office was not dismantled and is still working on land redistribution.⁹⁴

Chaco Region

In February 2008, INRA ordered the redistribution of land in the provinces Luis Calvo, Chuquisaca, and Cordillera, Santa Cruz. INRA technical brigades visited the area to measure the lands to be redistributed. In response, landlords organized "paramilitary task forces" to stop the INRA brigades, and in February 2008, the Cattle Ranchers' Federation (*Federación de Ganaderos*) drove INRA officers out of Camiri, and the Vice Minister of Labor was attacked and threatened with death on the Larsen *hacienda*, property of an American landlord with over 50,000 hectares of land.⁹⁵

In March 2008, landlords organized and blocked the roads to prevent visits from national governmental authorities. Meanwhile, the provincial sub-prefect (designated by the Governor of Santa Cruz), accompanied by armed bodyguards, burst into and broke up an INRA meeting in which the director of INRA was negotiating with a landlord to auction his lands off to the Guaraní.

On April 4th, 2008, it was reported that a new commission led by the same INRA authorities and accompanied by policemen and Guaranís, was heading to the indigenous community of Itakuatia to proceed with land redistribution. The commission was attacked with sticks and stones by cattle ranchers and people hired by a local landlord. The violence was mainly focused on the Guaranís and the police forces and the police captain who escorted the commission was seriously wounded.⁹⁶

On April 13, 2008, in the town of Cuervo, near Camiri, the most violent confrontation took place. A Guaraní delegation was attacked by a group of people, reportedly hired by regional landlords, resulting in the injury of 40 people and others being taken as hostages.⁹⁷ Simultaneously, political authorities from the Department of Santa Cruz together with associations of private entrepreneurs, denounced that the land redistribution was aimed at expelling all non-indigenous producers from the region and that all resources generated by exploitation of hydrocarbons throughout the department would be expropriated.

In November 2008, the National Government passed Supreme Decree 29802, which mandated that estates in which servitude persisted be turned over to the state, and that INRA brigades resume their duties in Alto Parapetí. Landlords denounced this as land confiscation by governmental authorities. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bolivia publicly lamented the aggressions suffered by Guaraní indigenous peoples and INRA authorities and Amnesty International urged landowners to break the vicious circle of indigenous poverty and exclusion.⁹⁸ In 2011, a UN technical mission reported that land redistribution was paralyzed in some towns, including Itakuatia, Alto Caraparí, Bajo Caraparí, and Colorada.⁹⁹

Appendix 2: Legal Framework

Bolivian Labor Law

The Labor Code, drafted in 1939 and enacted into law in 1942, only applies to the factory workers included in this study, as the law excludes agricultural workers from its sphere of protection.¹⁰⁰ In November 2007, under the *ley de trabajadores estacionales* (law on seasonal workers), coverage of the Labor Code was extended to seasonal Brazil-nut harvesters. Obligatory Social Security coverage was also extended to these workers.¹⁰¹ However, other agricultural workers still remain unprotected by the Labor Code.

The *Ley Trabajo Asalariado del Beneficiado de la Castaña* (the Labor Law for Salaried Work in Brazil-nut Processing), promulgated in December 2005, applies only to factory workers and not to the Brazil-nut harvesters. With reference to forced labor, that law prohibits payment in kind and sets a requirement of processing 35 kg of nuts daily to receive the national minimum wage. Workers who process less than 35 kg are paid a piece rate, but are not guaranteed a minimum wage. The law instituted a period of six months for the closure of employers' grocery stores, but paradoxically, allowed for up to 20 percent of workers' salaries to be used to purchase consumer goods from company stores. These company stores have been used as a way for employers to subject workers to debt bondage. It also prohibits the employment of children younger than 14 years of age. As demonstrated in this study, this law is undermined by poor compliance.

Laws on Forced Labor and Human Trafficking

In November 1990, Bolivia ratified ILO Convention No. 105 on the abolition of forced labor and in May 2005, it ratified Convention No. 29 on forced labor.¹⁰² In July 1991, Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.¹⁰³ In November 1993, it ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which explicitly states that no one can be held in slavery or servitude. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery was ratified by Law No. 2116 on September 11, 2000. Article 1 states that "Each of the States' Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention."¹⁰⁴

The newly adopted Political Constitution (*Constitución Política del Estado - CPE*) transformed Bolivia from a Republic to a Plurinational State. The CPE prohibits all forms of forced labor, or any other analogous forms of exploitation that require a person to perform work without his or her consent and/or without fair compensation.¹⁰⁵ This Constitution also prohibits the exploitation of children and states that productive

activities undertaken by children and adolescents should be aimed at their development as citizens.¹⁰⁶

Supreme Decree No. 29894 of February 7, 2009, which created the Organizational Structure of the Executive Branch of the Plurinational State, clarified the functions and jurisdiction of the Minister of Labor, Employment and Social Security, and the functions and jurisdiction of the Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Security, and the Vice-Minister of Employment, Civil Service and Cooperatives. Among their assigned functions is the eradication of forced labor or analogous forms of exploitation and servitude. Similarly, the powers of the Vice-Ministry of Labor and Social Security include the coordination and development of policies for the eradication of all forms of servitude.

Criminal laws on trafficking currently in effect include Law No. 3325 of January 18, 2006 "Trafficking in Persons and Related Crimes," and Law No. 3326 of January 18, 2006, which created the crime of Forced Disappearance of Persons. Laws on trafficking includes penalties of imprisonment of eight to 12 years for persons who induce, encourage, or carry out the transfer, recruitment, detention, or reception of people, inside or outside of Bolivia for slavery or analogous practices, commercial sexual exploitation, or labor exploitation.¹⁰⁷ They also make explicit reference to migrant smuggling and related offenses.¹⁰⁸

The June 2010, Judicial Branch Law (*Ley del Órgano Judicial*) establishes the Judicial Branch's jurisdiction including in matters pertaining to violations of the Labor Code.¹⁰⁹ The Law also recognizes peasant and indigenous groups' legal jurisdiction and establishes the validity and the exercise of their judicial functions. This is based on the Plurinational character of Bolivia; on the right of nations and peasant indigenous peoples to self-determination, autonomy, and self-government; and on rights recognized by the Constitution, ILO Convention 169, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Under this law, people who owned land on which workers were subjected to servitude and their representatives are prohibited from being members of Agro-Environmental Courts. Among the powers granted to these courts is the responsibility of redistributing land that is not being used for production or on which systems of servitude, slavery, or conditions analogous to slavery exist.

The Government led by Carlos Mesa issued Supreme Decree 23.159 in May 2005. This decree provides a definition of families in captivity or bound to their employers and provides for the registry of these families in order to grant them land and financing for the purchase of land to meet household needs.¹¹⁰

Laws on Child Labor

The Child and Adolescent Code sets a minimum age for child labor and includes provisions regulating hazardous labor among minors. Under the Code, children under the age of 14 are prohibited from working and all minors under the age of 18 must obtain permission from government authorities or their parents before engaging in work.

Employers are required by the Code to grant time off for education to adolescent workers between the ages of 14 and 17 who have not completed their schooling. Minors under the age of 18 are prohibited by the Code from engaging in hazardous work, including underground or night work, work involving pesticides or carrying excessive loads, and the harvesting of Brazil-nuts, sugarcane, or cotton.

Appendix 3: Questionnaire-Self-Employed Harvesters-Brazil-Nuts

1	Is there enough privacy	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Gender	M	<input type="checkbox"/>	F	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Date of birth	Day	<input type="text"/>	Month	<input type="text"/>
			<input type="text"/>		<input type="text"/>
5	Are you currently in a relationship	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	You are:	Single	<input type="checkbox"/>	living with someone	<input type="checkbox"/>
		married	<input type="checkbox"/>		
7	How many people do you support with your income?		<input type="text"/>		
8	Can you read and write	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Until what grade did you study	First and second			<input type="text"/>
		Third and fourth			<input type="text"/>
		Fifth and sixth			<input type="text"/>
		seventh and eight			<input type="text"/>
		high school			<input type="text"/>
		high school graduate			<input type="text"/>
	higher education	Years			<input type="text"/>
		Graduated			<input type="text"/>
		Degree			<input type="text"/>

22	How did you aquire this land	by purchase	<input type="checkbox"/>						
		by inheritance	<input type="checkbox"/>						
		by distribution	<input type="checkbox"/>						
		by court order	<input type="checkbox"/>						
		other	<input type="text"/>						
23	Did you ever leave the harvest area?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
24	If you leave, do you leave with your whole family with you?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
25	If they did not leave with you do they keep working?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
26	How often do you or can leave?	<input type="text"/>							(Qualitative)
27	For how many days do you leave?	<input type="text"/>							(Qualitative)

28 Did you buy something to go into the harvest?

YES

NO

LIST	Price: new	Price: used	How long was it used before you bought it?	time of use	How long will it last?
Machinery					
tools					
Non tangible equipment					
Carts					
Animals	Quantity	How much you would sell it for?			

37	How many kilos/boxes/bags do you get from each tree?	<input type="text"/>							
38	When you sell the nut how do you sell it?								
		By the kilo	<input type="checkbox"/>						
		By the box	<input type="checkbox"/>	how many kilos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
		by the bag	<input type="checkbox"/>	how many kilos	<input type="checkbox"/>				
39	How much do you sell it for?								
		Price: kilo	<input type="text"/>						
		Price: box	<input type="text"/>						
		Price: bag	<input type="text"/>						
40	Is the price always the same?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
41	The time you went to sell has the selling price varied?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
42	Do you have a selection process for the brazil nut?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
43	How is this selection process?								(Qualitative)
44	Do you get paid the same price for everything?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
45	Is there a kind of Brazil nuts that is more expensive?	<input type="text"/>							
46	How much do you get paid for this kind of nut?	<input type="text"/>							
47	How much have you sold during this harvest?	<input type="text"/>							
48	How many times have you gone out to sell?	<input type="text"/>							

49	Have you been paid the same all those times?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
50	How much were you paid the first time?	Dry		Moist					
51	How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell the first time?	Dry		Moist					
52	How much were you paid the second time?	Dry		Moist					
53	How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell the second time?	Dry		Moist					
54	How much were you paid the third time?	Dry		Moist					
55	How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell the third time?	Dry		Moist					
56	How much were you paid the fourth time?	Dry		Moist					
57	How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell the fourth time?	Dry		Moist					
58	How much were you paid the fifth time?	Dry		Moist					
59	How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell the fifth time?	Dry		Moist					
60	Did all those that harvest with you sell together?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
61	If someone sold seperatly who was it?	<input type="text"/>							
62	Do you know how much he sold during this hравest?	<input type="text"/>							
63	Did you have to borrow money in order to buy what you required for the harvest?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				
64	If so, how much?	<input type="text"/>							

62	Do you know how much he sold during this harvest?	<input type="text"/>							
63	Did you have to borrow money in order to buy what you required for the harvest?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>						
64	If so, how much?	<input type="text"/>							
65	Who lend you this money?	<input type="text"/>							
66	Did they ask for collateral?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>						
67	If so is the collateral returned to you after you pay the debt back?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>						
68	Do they charge you intrests for the loan?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>						
69	How much?	<input type="text"/>							
70	When do you pay the debt back?								
		At the end of harvest	<input type="checkbox"/>						
		During harvest	<input type="checkbox"/>						
71	How do you pay the debt?	<input type="text"/>							
72	If it is by quotas, how many do you pay?	<input type="text"/>							
73	How much do you pay for each quota?	<input type="text"/>							
74	If it is a one time fee what intrest are you charged?	<input type="text"/>							
75	What happens if you don't pay all the debt back?	<input type="text"/>							
76	Do you look for another job to finish paying the debt?	<input type="text"/>							

Appendix 4: Questionnaire-Salaried Harvesters-Brazil-Nuts

1 Is there enough privacy?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>		
3 Gender	M <input type="checkbox"/>	F <input type="checkbox"/>		
4 Date of birth	Day	Month	Year	
	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	
5 Are you in a relationship?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>		
6 You are:	single <input type="checkbox"/>	living with someone <input type="checkbox"/>		
	Married <input type="checkbox"/>			
7 How many people do you support on you income?	<input type="text"/>			
8 Can you read and write?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>		
9 What school grade did you finish?	First and second		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	third and fourth		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Fifth and sixth		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Seventh and eight		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	high school		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	schoolgrad		<input type="checkbox"/>	
higher education	Years		<input type="text"/>	
	Graduates		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	degree		<input type="checkbox"/>	
university	Years		<input type="text"/>	
	Graduates		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	degree		<input type="checkbox"/>	

10	What languages do you speak? (Can you read/write?)	Spanish	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Esse Eja	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Cavineño	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Chacobo	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Tacana	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Quechua	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Aymara	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		Portuguesse	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		english	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		other	<input type="text"/>		
11	What is your nationality?	Bolivian	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		other	<input type="text"/>		
12	Do you have a work permit?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Who brought you to the harvest?	<input type="text"/>			
14	Who paid for your fare?	<input type="text"/>			
15	Who is going to pay your return fare?	<input type="text"/>			
16	What is the distance between your home and the sites where you harvest?	See map			
17	How long does it take to get from your home to the sites where you harvest?	See map			

18 How are you transported to the harvest sites?

TRANSPORT	HOURS
on foot	
Motorcycle	
truck	
tractor	
small plane	
cart	
boat	
other	

19 Which is the closest town to your harvest sites?

see map

20 How do you communicate with your family?

- Telephone
- Radio
- letters
- social networks
- does not communicate
- other

21 How often do you communicate with your family?

- daily
- weekly
- once a month
- every two months
- every three months
- others

22 Do you personally know your "patron"*	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>							
23 How many times did you speak to him for this harvest?	<input type="text"/>								
24 How do you communicate with the administrator?	Telephone							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Radio							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	letters							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	social networks							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	does not communicate							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	other								<input type="text"/>
25 How often do you communicate with him?	daily							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	weekly							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	once a month							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	every two months							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	every three months							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	others								<input type="text"/>
26 How often does transportation get to your harvest site?	daily							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	once a week							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	once every two weeks							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	once a month							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	once every two months							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	once every three months							<input type="checkbox"/>	
	other								<input type="text"/>

27 Can you leave the harvest at any time?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
28 If not , why?	I am not allowed				<input type="checkbox"/>	
	I have no money				<input type="checkbox"/>	
	there are no means of transportation				<input type="checkbox"/>	
	other					<input type="text"/>
29 Do you have a work contract?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
30 Is it written or verbal?	Verbal			<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Written			<input type="checkbox"/>		
31 If it is a written contract, do you have a copy?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
32 If it is available can we check it together?	checklist					
33 Do you have to show some kind of document at the signing?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
34 If so, which one?						<input type="text"/>
35 Is this document returned immediately?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
36 Did you have to sign any other documents other than the contract or a blank document?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>		
37 How long does your work contract last?	Month	<input type="text"/>	Day	<input type="text"/>		
38 What date did you go into the harvest?	Month	<input type="text"/>	year	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
39 What date did you leave the harvest?	Month	<input type="text"/>	year	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

40 Who do you work for?		land owner	<input type="checkbox"/>				
		Famer	<input type="checkbox"/>				
		Beneficiary	<input type="checkbox"/>				
		contractor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
		indigenous land owner	<input type="checkbox"/>				
		other	<input type="text"/>				
41 How did you get this job?		From a contractor	<input type="checkbox"/>	Did he charge you something?	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		From a family member	<input type="checkbox"/>	Did he charge you something?	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		from a friend	<input type="checkbox"/>	Did he charge you something?	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		from a political party	<input type="checkbox"/>	Did it charge you something?	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		from the syndicate	<input type="checkbox"/>	Did it charge you something?	<input type="checkbox"/>		
		other	<input type="text"/>				
42 Who goes with you to harvest?							
spouse		<input type="checkbox"/>	gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	age	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	How long did he/she work in the harvest?			months	<input type="text"/>	days	<input type="text"/>
children		1	gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	age	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	How long did he/she work in the harvest?			months	<input type="text"/>	days	<input type="text"/>
		2	gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	age	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	How long did he/she work in the harvest?			months	<input type="text"/>	days	<input type="text"/>
		3	gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	age	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	How long did he/she work in the harvest?			months	<input type="text"/>	days	<input type="text"/>
		4	gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	age	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	How long did he/she work in the harvest?			months	<input type="text"/>	days	<input type="text"/>

43	Did they sign work contracts too?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
44	If so, who did?	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>			
45	In case of accidents can you leave to seek medical assistance?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
46	If not, where are you taken care of?	On site	<input type="checkbox"/>	They do not receive medical attention	<input type="checkbox"/>
47	Did you get sick during the harvest?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
48	Were you taken care of?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
49	Who took care of you?	<input type="text"/>			
50	Who covered the expenses?	<input type="text"/>			
51	Did you get medical leave?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
52	How do you deliver the brazil nut?	By kilo	<input type="checkbox"/>	by the box	<input type="checkbox"/>
		by the bag	<input type="checkbox"/>		
53	How much are you paid for the :	kilo	<input type="checkbox"/>	box	<input type="checkbox"/>
		bag	<input type="checkbox"/>		

61	Are you given an "habilito" during the harvest? (1)	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	(1) The "habilito" is a mechanism by which workers receive an advance on their payment in kind during the harvest.
62	What are you given?			
	Good	ACTUAL PRICE	MARKET PRICE	
63	Who gives the "habilito" to you?	<input type="text"/>		
64	Do you pay any interest for the debt?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	
65	If so, how much?	<input type="text"/>		
66	If you did not manage to pay back the debt during the period established in your contract, how much more did you have to work?	<input type="text"/>		
67	Did you still end up owing money?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	
68	If so, how are you paying your debt?	<input type="text"/>		
69	Are you charged a fine if you don't pay back the debt on time?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	
70	How do you pay back the debt?	<input type="text"/>		
71	What happens if you do not finish paying the debt?	<input type="text"/>		
72	If you have the copy of the settlement, can you show it to me?	Checklist		
73	If you buy tools for the harvest is this amount deducted from your pay?	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	

Appendix 5: Questionnaire-Factory Workers-Brazil-Nuts

Nº						
1	Is there enough privacy	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3	Gender	M	<input type="checkbox"/>	F	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4	Date of birth	Day	<input type="text"/>	month	<input type="text"/>	Year <input type="text"/>
5	Are you currently involved in a relationship	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
6	You are:	single	<input type="text"/>	Living with someone	<input type="checkbox"/>	
		married	<input type="text"/>			
7	How many people do you support with your income?	<input type="text"/>				
8	Can you read and write?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9	What school grade did you finish?					
	First and second	<input type="checkbox"/>	higher education	<input type="checkbox"/>	years	<input type="checkbox"/>
	third and fourth	<input type="checkbox"/>	graduated	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	fifth and sixth	<input type="checkbox"/>	university	<input type="checkbox"/>	years	<input type="checkbox"/>
	seventh and eight	<input type="checkbox"/>	graduated	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	high school	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	high school graduate	<input type="checkbox"/>				
10	What languages do you speak?					
	Spanish	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tacana	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Esse Eja	<input type="checkbox"/>	Aymara	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Cavineño	<input type="checkbox"/>	Portuguese	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Chácobo	<input type="checkbox"/>	English	<input type="checkbox"/>		
11	Nationality	Boliviana	<input type="text"/>			
		Other	<input type="text"/>			
12	Do you have the following documents?					
		ID	<input type="text"/>			
		Passport	<input type="text"/>			
		Other	<input type="text"/>			

13	Where do you live?	Show on map			
		District		<input type="text"/>	
		Town		<input type="text"/>	
		zone		<input type="text"/>	
14	How long does it take to get to your workplace?	Hrs	<input type="text"/>	Min	<input type="text"/>
15	What means of transportation do you use to get to work?				
	Motorcycle	<input type="checkbox"/>	bus	<input type="text"/>	
	Taxi	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="text"/>	
16	Which of the following services do you have at	Water		<input type="text"/>	
		electricity		<input type="text"/>	
		Sewer acces		<input type="text"/>	
17	Which of the following institutions are there near your				
	Market	<input type="checkbox"/>	Health center	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Primary school	<input type="checkbox"/>	hospital	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	High school	<input type="checkbox"/>	Police station	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Notery	<input type="checkbox"/>			
18	Where do you work?	<input type="text"/>			
19	How long have you worked there?	Years	<input type="text"/>	Months	<input type="text"/>
20	What is your job title in the factory?				
	transporter	<input type="checkbox"/>	baker	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	cargo handler	<input type="checkbox"/>	shell breaker	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			packing	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			other	<input type="text"/>	
21	Did you sign a work contract?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
22	Can you show me your work contract?	(check list)			

23	What are the documents you presented during your interview?								
	ID	<input type="checkbox"/>	Birth certificate					<input type="checkbox"/>	
	others	<hr/>							
24	Were any of these documents withheld by the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>				
25	Do you have free access to these documents?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>				
26	Do you have to give some kind of collateral when you are signing your work contract?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>				
27	Did you have to sign another document that was not the work contract or was blank?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>				
28	How did you get this job?								
	from a contractor?	<input type="checkbox"/>	did he charge you something?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	from a family member	<input type="checkbox"/>	did he charge you something?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	from a friend	<input type="checkbox"/>	did he charge you something?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	from a political party	<input type="checkbox"/>	did it charge you something?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Otro	<hr/>							
29	How much where you charged?	<hr/>							
30	How many days a week do you work?	num. days	<input type="text"/>						
31	What time do you get in to work?	Hrs	<input type="text"/>		Min	<input type="text"/>			
32	Do you go out to eat lunch?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	Where?	<hr/>				
		NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	Where?	<hr/>				
33	How much time do you take for lunch break?	Hrs	<input type="text"/>		Min	<input type="text"/>			
34	Do you take other breaks?	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>				

35	How many?	Num.	<input type="text"/>		
36	How long is each break?	Min	<input type="text"/>		
37	Do you have free access to the bathrooms?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
38	Do you have to ask permission to go to the bathroom?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
39	Why?	<hr/>			
40	Can you drink water at any time?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
41	Do you have to ask for permission to drink water?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
42	If yes, to whom?	<hr/>			
43	What time do you leave your work?	Hrs	<input type="text"/>	Min	<input type="text"/>
44	How are you paid?	In money	<input type="text"/>		
		In goods	<input type="text"/>		
45	Are you satisfied with what they are paying you?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
46	How often are you paid?				
	Monthly	<input type="checkbox"/>	How much?	<input type="text"/>	
	Weekly	<input type="checkbox"/>	How much?	<input type="text"/>	
	Every two weeks	<input type="checkbox"/>	How much?	<input type="text"/>	
	Daily	<input type="checkbox"/>	How much?	<input type="text"/>	
	other	<hr/>			
47	How are you paid?				
	By volume	<input type="checkbox"/>			
	By product	<input type="checkbox"/>			
	other	<hr/>			

48	Concerning shell breakers				
Breakers					
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Price per kilo					
Price per box					
Price per bag					
Price per basket					
49	How many kilos do you break daily?	Kg.	<input type="text"/>		
50	Do you get advances?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
51	Do you get them in money or in kind	<input type="text"/>			
52	If it is in kind, do you get a voucher to pick the goods up?	<input type="text"/>			
53	Where do you pick them up?	<input type="text"/>			
54	How often are you given these advancements ?				
	Every week	<input type="checkbox"/>	Only when necesary	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Every month	<input type="checkbox"/>			
55	How do you pay the debt?				
	They discount it from my pay	<input type="checkbox"/>	I work at another assosiated company	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	With other jobs inside the company	<input type="checkbox"/>	With another job someplace else	<input type="checkbox"/>	
56	How often do ou pay the debt				
	Every day	<input type="checkbox"/>	every month	<input type="text"/>	
	Every week	<input type="checkbox"/>	When im paid	<input type="text"/>	
	every two weeks	<input type="checkbox"/>			
57	Do you pay intrests for the debt?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	How much?	<input type="text"/>
				NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
58	What happens if ou don't pay the debt back?				

59	Do the workers have a union?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
60	Do you belong to this union?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
61	What are the benefits of belonging to the union?						
62	Are you forced to be a member?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
63	Do you have to pay to be a member?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	How much?			NO <input type="checkbox"/>
64	Do the workers have any other kind of association?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
65	Have you seen a child working at the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
66	Are there black lists in the company?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
67	Do you know of anyone who had sexual relations to get this job?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
68	Have you ever seen the administrator or anybody in charge armed?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		
69	Have you ever been threatened?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
70	Are you afraid of something?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
71	Do you know of anyone who was ever threatened with a weapon or with something else?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
72	Have the administrators or those in charge ever beaten anybody?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
73	Are you afraid someone might hurt you?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
74	Are you aware of anyone the company does not want to hire?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
75	Are you aware of anyone who has not fulfilled his/her work contract?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)
76	Do you or did you have a complaint about the company?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>		(Qualitative)

77	Was your complaint adressed and taken care of?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
78	Is there a medical office inside the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
79	Did you suffer any kind of accident inside the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
80	Who took care of you?					
	The doctor	<input type="checkbox"/>	No one		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	The nurse	<input type="checkbox"/>	other	_____		
81	Who covered the expenses?		The company	<input type="checkbox"/>		
			I did	<input type="checkbox"/>		
82	Where were you taken care of?	_____				
83	Were you given medical leave?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
84	Are the bathrooms hygienic?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
85	Have you ever got sick as a consequence of your job or for working too much?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
86	Can you leave your work area at any time?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
87	If for any reason you needed to leave you job, would you be allowed?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
88	Is there security personel present in the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
89	Are they armed?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
90	Are you given a body check upon entering and exiting the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
91	Is it against the rules to take sometihing from the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
92	Is it against the rules to take something into the factory?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
93	When you are working inside the factory how do you communicate with your family?					
	Phone	<input type="checkbox"/>	we are not allowed		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	By cellphones	<input type="checkbox"/>				

94	Have you ever stayed to work late?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
95	Do you work on holidays?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
96	Do you get paid for those extra hours?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
97	Do you have medical insurance?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
98	¿Do you pay to the AFP (Administrator of pension funds)?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
99	Do you have maternity and breast feeding insurance?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
100	Has anyone ever yelled at you at work?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
101	If yes, who?					
	The administrator	<input type="checkbox"/>	those who work with me?		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	The one in charge	<input type="checkbox"/>	Others			
102	Do you get bonuses?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
103	Do you get vacation?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)
104	Do you get a christmas bonus?	YES	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Qualitative)

Appendix 6: Questionnaire-Self-Employed Workers- Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts

Identificación de la encuesta

Clave del encuestador Fecha

Día	Mes	Año
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

 Lugar Comunidad

Municipio Suficiente privacidad Si No

Estamos haciendo una encuesta para mejorar las condiciones de trabajo en la región, la información que nos de es confidencial y nadie va a saber que usted ha sido la persona que no las ha dado, por que se va a mezclar con la información que nos están dando muchas otras personas. ¿está usted de acuerdo en participar? Si No

Trabaja usted con ... Maíz Maní Ganado Bovino

1 ¿Cuál es su nombre? 2 Sexo M F 3 Edad años

4 Fecha de Nacimiento

Día	Mes	Año
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

 5 ¿Sabes leer y escribir? Si No

6 Hasta que curso estudiaste?

7 ¿Estás Soltero/a? Conviviendo? Casado/a? Viudo/a? Divorciado/a?

8 Por favor hagamos una lista de todas las personas de tu familia y de las personas que te ayudan a trabajar. Me va usted a decir ¿cómo se llama?, ¿qué es de usted si es su pariente o si no es su pariente?, ¿qué edad tienen?, vamos a anotar si es hombre o mujer, y si trabaja o no en la producción de maíz, maní o

Nombre	Parentesco	Edad	Sexo	Trabaja en la producción de:						Cualitativas
				Maíz		Maní		Ganado Bovino		
				Si	No	Si	No	Si	No	
1				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
5				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

9 Contratas gente para que te ayude? Si Cuantos? No

10 Si es si cuanto les pagas

11 ¿Que herramientas utilizas para trabajar?

12 ¿Qué animales, tractores u otros vehículos usa para trabajar?

¿Qué herramientas usas?	¿Cuántas usa?	¿A que precio ha comprado cada una?

¿Qué tipo de animal o vehículo usa?	¿Cuántos usa?	Es propio ¿sí o no?	Es alquilado o ¿sí o no?	¿En Cuánto has comprado si es propio?	¿Hace cuántos años que lo compró?	Si es alquilado ¿por Cuánto tiempo lo alquila?	¿Cuánto paga por el alquiler por el tiempo que lo alquila?

13 ¿Has comprado semillas?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>				
14 Cuanto has comprado			15 Cuanto te ha costado			
16 ¿Has comprado abono?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto te costo		No <input type="checkbox"/>	Cualitativas	
17 ¿Has comprado herbicida?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto te costo		No <input type="checkbox"/>		
18 ¿Has comprado plaguicida?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto te costo		No <input type="checkbox"/>		
19 Cuantos quintales de maíz haz producido						
20 Cuantos quintales de maíz haz vendido					Cualitativas	
21 A cuanto haz vendido el quintal de maíz?						
22 Cuantos quintales de maní haz producido						
23 Cuantos quintales de maní haz vendido?						
24 A cuanto haz vendido el quintal de maní?					Cualitativas	
25 La tierra es tuya o arrendada	mía <input type="checkbox"/>					
	Arrendada <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto pagas de alquiler por todas las hectareas?				
26 ¿Para sacar tu producto fletas transporte?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto	No <input type="checkbox"/>	Propio <input type="checkbox"/>		
27 ¿Te prestaste dinero para herramientas, semillas plaguicidas abono u otros?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto	No <input type="checkbox"/>			
		deudas				
28 De quien?		Como le pagas? servidumbre		Acabaste de pagarle? deudas	Si <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	
29 ¿Tienes ganado criollo?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto		No <input type="checkbox"/>	Cualitativas	
30 ¿Tienes ganado mejorado o de raza cebú?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto		No <input type="checkbox"/>		
31 ¿Tienes ganado mestizo?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto		No <input type="checkbox"/>		
32 Para la cría de ganado la tierra es tuya o arrendada?	mía <input type="checkbox"/>					
	Arrendada <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanto pagas de alquiler por todas las hectareas?				
33 ¿Contratas gente para criar tu ganado?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuanta Gente		No <input type="checkbox"/>		
34 Como les pagas		Cada cuanto				
35 Vendes tu ganado?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>				
36 Este año cuantas cabezas vendiste?			37 A cuanto vendiste cada cabeza			
38 Sacas otros productos del ganado para vender?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	Cual	A cuanto lo vendes	Cuantos?	No <input type="checkbox"/>	
39 Cuanto gastas en mantener a tu ganado?	(al mes vacunas, sal, otras)					
40 ¿Pertenece a alguna asociación de trabajadores, como sindicato u otro tipo de organización de campesinos o indígenas?	Si <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>				

		Cualitativas
41	¿Te obligan a pertenecer a ella? Si <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	
42	¿Pagas alguna cuota en dinero o en especie por pertenecer a ella? Si <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ¿Cuánto? _____	
43	¿Contratas mujeres para que trabajen tu tierra? Si <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	
44	Si el entrevistado es Indígena ¿Contratas gente de otros grupos indígenas? Si <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	
45	Por que no contratarías a alguien? _____	
46	¿Cuántas horas al día trabajas? _____	
47	¿Cuántos días a la semana trabajas? _____	

16 Si es no. ¿Por qué? No me dejan No tengo dinero
 No hay transporte Otros

17 ¿Te castigan si sales de tu trabajo? SI NO

18 ¿El que te ha contratado te ha hecho firmar contrato? SI NO

19 ¿Como te están pagando? Dinero Especie Mixto

20 ¿Cuanto te pagan? Por contrato Jornal
 Mensual Otro

21 Si es en especie. ¿Que te dan?

ESPECIE	CADA CUANTO

22 ¿Estas cosas te las cobran? SI NO

23 ¿Si utilizas herramientas, quien te las da?

Te lo da el patrón Tu los compras

24 Si te las da el patrón te cobra? SI NO

25 Si te las compras tu. Cuanto has gastado?

26 ¿Antes de entrar a trabajar te han dado dinero o cosas?

Dinero Cuanto Cosas

27 Cuanto te han descontado de las cosas? Cuanto

28 ¿Sigues pagando todavía? ¿Puedes terminar de pagar el próximo año? SI NO

29 ¿Alguien recibe las cosas que te dan? El/Ella
 (Sueldo o especies) Otro Quien?

30 Alguna vez no te han querido contratar? Por que?
 Sabes de alguien que no hayan querido contratar?

CUALITATIVAS

31	¿Pertenece a algún sindicato, organización campesina, organización indígena u OTB ?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
32	¿Te obligan a estar en esa organización?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
33	En tu trabajo alguna vez te han ...	Gritado	<input type="checkbox"/>	Amenazado	<input type="checkbox"/>	
		Insultado	<input type="checkbox"/>	Burlado	<input type="checkbox"/>	
34	¿A caso no les pega?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
35	¿Te ha pegado a vos?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Si la entrevistada es mujer					
36	¿Te molestan tu jefe o tus compañeros? (silbidos, piropos, salidas a tomar, llevarlas a la cama)		SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
37	¿Te has quejado?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
38	¿Sabes de otra persona que le hayan hecho lo mismo?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
39	¿Tu o alguno de tus compañeros sufrió algún accidente mientras trabajaba?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
40	¿Quien pago la atención?	_____				
41	Si es una tercera persona. ¿Te cobro?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
42	¿Cuantos días a la semana trabajas?	<input type="text"/>				
43	Mientras trabajas. ¿Donde Vives?	_____				
44	¿Te cobran o te descuentan de lo que te pagan por vivir ahí?	SI	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	<input type="checkbox"/>	
45	Si es si. ¿Cuanto y como te lo cobran?	_____				

CUALITATIVAS

Appendix 8: Worker Interview Locations

Brazil-Nuts

Brazil-Nut Harvesters Interviewed								
Amazon Region: Harvesters' communities visited	Candelaria	El Hondo	Santa Maria	Matewa	Santa Ana	7 de Julio	Warnes	Total self-employed campesino workers interviewed
Self-employed campesino workers interviewed	15	2	10	1	1	2	10	66
Amazon Region: Harvesters' communities visited	Democracia	Buen futuro	Bruno Recreo	Perla del oriente	Peninsula	Antofagasta	Espiritu 2	
Self-employed campesino workers interviewed	9	1	1	1	1	11	1	
Amazon Region: Harvesters' communities visited	Tacana	Versalles	El Carmen	3 Estrellas	Santa Ana	Do not declare	Total self-employed indigenous workers interviewed	
Self-employed indigenous workers interviewed	12	1	8	10	8	2	41	
Amazon Region: Harvesters' communities visited	Puerto Rico	Puerto Cavino	El Sena	3 Estrellas	Fortaleza	El Nacobe	Cobija	Total salaried workers interviewed
Salaried Workers interviewed	4	1	9	2	1	1	3	74
Amazon Region: Harvesters' communities visited	Ballivian	Bolivar	Triangulo	Riberalt a	Chive	Interviewed at roads, buses, boats, and barracas		
Salaried Workers interviewed	1	1	1	1	2	47		

Brazil-Nuts Factory Workers Interviewed						
Amazon Region: Brazil-nut factory workers' place of employment	Urkupina	CAIC	Empresa de las Almendras	Beneficiadora Lourdes	Beneficiadora Vargas	Total factory workers interviewed
Salaried factory workers interviewed	22	3	1	1	2	64
Amazon Region: Brazil-nut factory workers' place of employment	Balrott Hermanos	Tahuamanu	Beneficiadora Blacutt	Amazonas	Empresa Boldes	
Salaried factory workers interviewed	1	15	7	2	1	
Amazon Region: Brazil-nut factory workers' place of employment	Empresa Greenfor	Manutata	Bowles	Becerra	Peri-urban neighborhoods of Riberalta city	
Salaried factory workers interviewed	1	1	3	1	3	

Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts

Chaco Region:	Cattle, Corn, and Peanut Producers Interviewed During First Field Visit						
Community name	Yuki	Palmarcito	Chouchapea	Ivo	San Francisco	Iguembito	Tacurbity
Corn Producers	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
Peanut Producers	2	2	0	1	0	1	1
Cattle Producers	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
Community name	Yaire	Repollar	Ancahuasu	Santiesteban	Nilo Rioja	Villa Vaca Guzman	Itau
Corn Producers	5	1	1	1	1	1	1
Peanut Producers	3	0	0	1	0	1	0
Cattle Producers	5	1	1	1	1	1	1
Community name	Kuruyuki	Urendeiti	Itacarai	Taminagua	Villa Esperanza	Toterendu	Villa Victoria
Corn Producers	1	1	0	1	1	2	2
Peanut Producers	0	1	2	1	0	0	0
Cattle Producers	1	1	0	1	1	2	2
Community name	Florida	Yauarenda	Itakarai	Huacareta	Campo Largo	Navaronda	Iguembe
Corn Producers	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
Peanut Producers	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Cattle Producers	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
Community name	Ipati del ivo	Boya	Tacurvite	Pincal	Pirirenda Dorita	Pirirenda	Casa Alta
Corn Producers	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Peanut Producers	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Cattle Producers	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Community	Pipiparireda	Hacienda	Itacuatia	Rodeo	Guaraka	Carapari	Hacienda

name		de Huacareta					Canada del Parapeti
Corn Producers	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
Peanut Producers	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Cattle Producers	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
Community name	Parlamento	Total number of workers interviewed per product					
Corn Producers	1	42					
Peanut Producers	0	21					
Cattle Producers	1	65					

Appendix 9: Chart of Findings by Product

Brazil-nuts				
Indicators	Salaried Workers		Self-Employed Workers	
	x:n	%	x:n	%
Demographic Characteristics				
Number of Workers Interviewed: 273	166 of 273	61%	107 of 273	39%
Indicators of Forced Labor				
<i>Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest Charges, etc.)</i>				
Employer provided workers with food	132 of 273	48%	N/A	
Deductions from pay	72 of 273	26%	N/A	
Deductions for tools	63 of 166	38%	N/A	
Made enough to pay off debts	128 of 166	77%	26 of 107	24%
Were indebted	154 of 273	56%	0	0%
<i>Withholding and Non-Payment of Wages</i>				
Payment of part of wages in kind	132 of 166	80%	0	0%

General Menace of Penalty				
Could leave when they wanted	97 de 166	58%	107 of 107	100%
Physical Violence Against Worker or Family or Close Associates				
Armed guards	67 of 166	40%	0	0%
Threatened by armed administrator	14 of 166	8%	0	0%
Were screamed at	21 of 166	13%	0	0%
Were hit or saw a guard or administrator hit someone	23 of 166	14%	0	0%
Sexual Violence				
Sexual violence was used as a threat or punishment	10 of 166	6%	0	0%
Knew of people who had had sexual relations in order to keep their jobs	10 of 166	6%	0	0%
Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement				
Used as threat or punishment	39 of 166	23%	0	0%
Dismissal from Current Employment				

Used as threat or punishment	11 of 166	7%	0	0%
Exclusion from Future Employment				
Used as threat or punishment	50 of 166	30%	0	0%
Exclusion from Community and Social Life				
Used as threat or punishment	0	0%	107 of 107	100%
Removal of Rights or Privileges				
Used as threat or punishment	0	0%	105 of 107	98%
Working Hours				
Average number of hours per day	10		10	
Average number of days per week	6		6	
Payment				
Paid part of salary in kind	137 of 166	83%	0	0%
Average amount earned during harvest	Salaried factory workers: BOB 653 Salaried harvesters: BOB 500		Indigenous campesinos BOB 2,416	
Earned less than the national minimum wage	134 of 166	81%	61 of 107	57%

Cattle				
Indicators	Salaried Workers		Self-Employed Workers	
	x:n	%	x:n	%
Demographic Characteristics				
Number of Workers Interviewed: 233	100 of 233	43%	133 of 233	57%
Women	31 of 100	31%	50 of 133	38%
Men	69 of 100	69%	83 of 133	62%
Average age	43		43	
Minors	0	0%	1 of 133	1%
Married or in stable relationship	84 of 100	84%	109 of 133	82%
Had children	38 of 100	38%	74 of 133	56%
Average number of children	4		3	
Average number of years of schooling	5		5	
Temporary workers	100 of 100	100%	0 of 133	0%
Indicators of Forced Labor				
<i>Physical Confinement in the Work Location</i>				

Felt free to leave	92 of 100	92%	133 of 133	100%
Restrictions on freedom of movement	11 of 100	5%	0	0%
Could not walk off worksite	11 of 100	5%	0	0%
<i>Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat of a Penalty for Non-Compliance)</i>				
Scared or frightened	9 of 100	9%	0	0%
<i>Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest Charges, etc.)</i>				
Used labor broker	11 of 100	11%	0	0%
Did not sign contract with broker (out of those that used a broker)	11 of 11	100%	N/A	
Paid to obtain employment	4 of 100	4%	N/A	
Average amount paid	BOB 42		N/A	
Had to borrow money	39 of 100	39%	26 of 133	20%

Corn				
Indicators	Salaried Workers		Self-Employed Workers	
	x:n	%	x:n	%
Demographic Characteristics				
Number of workers Interviewed: 537	140 of 537	26%	397 of 537	74%
Women	46 of 140	33%	176 of 397	44%
Men	94 of 140	67%	221 of 397	56%
Average age	43		43	
Minors	3 of 140	2%	9 of 397	2%
Married or in stable relationship	103 of 140	74%	302 of 397	76%
Had children	88 of 140	63%	176 of 397	44%
Average number of children	7		7	
Average number of years of schooling	5		5	
Temporary workers	140 of 140	100%	0	0%
Indicators of Forced Labor				
<i>Physical Confinement in the Work Location</i>				
Felt free to leave	93 of 140	66%	397 of 397	100%
Restrictions on freedom of movement	47 of 140	34%	0	0%

Could not walk off worksite	47 of 140	34%	0	0%
<i>Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat of a Penalty for Non-Compliance)</i>				
Scared or frightened	13 of 140	9%	0	0%
<i>Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest Charges, etc.)</i>				
Used labor broker	9 of 140	6%	0	0%
Paid to obtain employment	5 of 140	4%	0	0%
Average amount paid	BOB 45		N/A	
Had to borrow money	55 of 140	39%	79 of 397	20%
Average amount borrowed	BOB 466		BOB 6,000	

Peanuts				
Indicators	Salaried Workers		Self-Employed Workers	
	x:n	%	x:n	%
Demographic Characteristics				
Number of Workers Interviewed: 278	102 of 278	37%	176 of 278	63%
Women	45 of 102	44%	79 of 176	28%
Men	57 of 102	56%	97 of 176	35%
Average age	43		43	
Minors	1 of 102	1%	2 of 176	1%
Married or in stable relationship	45 of 102	44%	143 of 176	81%
Had children	11 of 102	11%	91 of 176	52%
Average number of children	4		5	
Average number of years of schooling	5		5	
Temporary workers	102 of 102	100%	0	0%
Indicators of Forced Labor				
<i>Physical Confinement in the Work Location</i>				
Felt free to leave	86 of 102	84%	176 of 176	100%
Restrictions on freedom of movement	16 of 102	16%	0	0%

Could not walk off worksite	16 of 102	16%	0	0%
<i>Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat of a Penalty for Non-Compliance)</i>				
Scared or frightened	19 of 102	19%	0	0%
<i>Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest Charges, etc.)</i>				
Used labor broker	14 of 102	14%	0	0%
Paid to obtain employment	4 of 102	4%	0	0%
Average amount paid	BOB 42		N/A	
Had to borrow money/goods	40 of 102	39%	50 of 176	28%

Appendix 10: Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor-Brazil-Nuts

As discussed in the Methodology section, after data collection and analysis was completed using the 2005 ILO indicators “Forced Labor in Practice”, Verité undertook a post-hoc analysis of the research findings with respect to a broader spectrum of indicators of forced labor presented in the ILO's 2011 publication, *Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labor of Adults and Children*. A chart of these indicators follows.

		Present
Indicators of unfree recruitment	Strong Indicators of Involuntariness	
	Tradition, birth (birth/descent into 'slave' or bonded status)	
	Coercive recruitment (abduction, confinement during the recruitment process)	
	Sale of the worker	
	Recruitment linked to debt (advance or loan)	Harvesters were provided with advances of overpriced food, supplies, and tools in the form of a <i>habilito</i> , which they had to pay back with undervalued Brazil-nuts that they harvested.
	Deception about the nature of the work	Some workers reported that they were not informed about additional tasks that they would have to carry out
	Medium Indicators of Involuntariness	
	Deceptive recruitment (regarding working conditions, content, or legality of employment)	A low percentage of workers, especially those recruited by labor brokers, had written contracts. Workers reported that they were deceived about their conditions of employment and earnings and that they did not have access to the accounting of debts and payments.

contract, housing and living conditions, legal documentation or acquisition of legal migrant status, job location or employer, wages/earnings)	
Deceptive recruitment through promises of marriage	
Strong Indicators of Menace of Penalty	
Denunciation to authorities	
Confiscation of identity papers or travel documents	Some workers reported that their identity documents were retained by money lenders as collateral and were not returned until they paid back the loans.
Sexual violence	
Physical violence	
Other forms of punishment	
Removal of rights or privileges (including promotion)	
Religious retribution	
Withholding of assets (cash or other)	

	Threats against family members	
	Medium Indicators of Menace of Penalty	
	Exclusion from future employment	
	Exclusion from community and social life	
	Financial penalties	
	Informing family, community, or public about worker's current situation (blackmail)	

Indicators of work and life under duress	Strong indicators of involuntariness	
	Forced overtime (beyond legal limits)	Harvesters reported having to work up to 16 hours per day during the harvest season and factory workers reported having to work up to 15 hours per day during the high season. In both of these cases some workers had to work excessive hours in order to make enough money to pay off their debts.
	Forced to work on call (day and night)	
	Limited freedom of movement and communication	Harvesters were extremely isolated in remote <i>barracas</i> that took an average of 18 hours to reach from their communities. Many workers had to remain in these <i>barracas</i> throughout the harvest season due to the expense of transportation.
	Degrading living	

conditions	
Medium indicators of involuntariness	
Forced engagement in illegal activities	
Forced to work for employer's private home or family	
Induced addiction to illegal substances	
Induced or inflated indebtedness (by falsification of accounts, inflated prices for goods/services purchased, reduced value of goods/services produced, excessive interest rates on loans, etc.)	<p>Harvesters were provided with advances of food, supplies, and tools in the form of a <i>habilito</i>. The prices for these products were higher than the market price and workers had to pay back the <i>habilito</i> by providing the lenders with a certain amount of Brazil-nuts. The price of the Brazil-nuts was set at the beginning of the harvest season and was generally lower than the market price, and there were reports of fraud in the weighing/measuring of the Brazil-nuts.</p> <p>Some factory workers were “account holders” who received advances of food and supplies from factory stores. These products were overpriced and workers had to pay them back with deductions in their wages.</p>
Multiple dependency on employer (jobs for relatives, housing, etc.)	Harvesters depended on their employers and lenders for food, supplies, and tools. They were so isolated that if these products were not delivered they could starve to death.
Pre-existence of dependency relationship with employer	
Being under the influence of	

employer or people related to employer for non-work life	
Strong indicators of penalty (or menace of penalty)	
Denunciation to authorities	
Confiscation of identity papers or travel documents	Some workers reported that their identity documents were retained by money lenders as collateral and were not returned until they paid back the loans.
Confiscation of mobile phones	
Further deterioration in working conditions	Harvesters who were unable to harvest enough Brazil-nuts to pay off their <i>habilito</i> reported that they could be made to stay on at the <i>barracas</i> working as maintenance workers or Brazil-nut transporters under worse conditions and for less pay.
Isolation	Some harvesters reported that they were “abandoned” in the jungles and were so physically isolated and transportation was employer provided or so expensive that they could not leave their places of work.
Locked in workplace or living quarters	
Sexual violence	There were reports of sexual violence and harassment.
Physical violence	There were reports of armed guards and <i>barraca</i> managers, threats of physical violence, and physical abuse.
Other forms of punishment (deprivation of food, water, sleep, etc.)	Harvesters who did not pay off their <i>habilito</i> may not receive a <i>habilito</i> the next harvest season and may be blacklisted.
Violence against	Some workers reported that other workers were beaten in

worker in front of other worker	front of them.
Removal or rights or privileges (including promotion)	Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for indigenous or peasant communities reported that if they failed to provide their community leaders with a certain amount of Brazil-nuts they could lose their land rights.
Religious retribution	Workers reported superstitions that they could be “swallowed” by the jungle for disobeying orders.
Constant surveillance	
Withholding of assets (cash or other)	
Withholding of wages	Harvesters were not paid until the end of the harvest season. If in fact they earned money during the harvest season, many harvesters had to wait months (until their lender sold the Brazil-nuts that they harvested) before receiving payment.
Threats against family members	Workers reported threats of violence against family members.
Medium indicators of penalty (or menace of penalty)	
Dismissal	Factory workers reported being threatened with dismissal.
Exclusion from future employment	Workers interviewed reported exclusion from future employment as a punishment, as well as the use of blacklists.
Exclusion from community and social life	Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for indigenous or peasant communities reported that they could receive punishments, including expulsion from their communities, for failing to harvest a certain amount of Brazil-nuts.

	Extra work for breaching labor discipline	
	Financial penalties	
	Informing family, community or public about worker's current situation (blackmail)	

Indicators of impossibility of leaving employer	Strong indicators of involuntariness	
	Reduced freedom to terminate labor contract after training or other benefit paid by employer	Some workers reported that they did not feel that they were free to leave their places of work due to debts or a lack of transportation.
	No freedom to resign in accordance with legal requirements	Some workers reported that they did not feel that they were free to leave their places of work due to debts or a lack of transportation.
	Forced to stay longer than agreed while waiting for wages due	Harvesters were not paid until the end of the harvest. Many harvesters were so physically isolated and transportation (which was only provided by the employer at the beginning and end of the harvest season) was so expensive that they could not leave until the harvest season was finished.
	Forced to work for indeterminate period to repay outstanding debt or wage advance	Some harvesters were not able to pay off their <i>habilito</i> by the end of the harvest season. If this was the case, some of the workers were forced to stay on at the <i>barracas</i> working in other positions or at Brazil-nut processing factories. Among these workers, some were not able to pay off their <i>habilito</i> by the next harvest season and thus

	fell into a cycle of debt.
Strong indicators of penalty (or menace of penalty)	
Denunciation to authorities	
Confiscation of identify paper or travel documents	Some workers reported that their identity documents were retained by money lenders as collateral and were not returned until they paid back the loans.
Imposition of worse working conditions	Workers who were unable to harvest enough Brazil-nuts to pay off their <i>habilito</i> reported that they could be made to stay on at the <i>barracas</i> working as maintenance workers or Brazil-nut transporters under worse conditions and for less pay.
Locked in work or living quarters	
Sexual violence	
Physical violence	There were reports of armed guards and <i>barraca</i> managers, threats of physical violence, and physical abuse.
Other forms of punishment (deprivation of food, water, sleep, etc.)	Harvesters depended on their employers and lenders for food, supplies, and tools. They were so isolated that if these products were not delivered they could starve to death. Workers reported that they were threatened with withholding of food and supplies.
Removal of rights or benefits (including promotion)	Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for indigenous or peasant communities reported that if they failed to provide their community leaders with a certain amount of Brazil-nuts they could lose their land rights.
Religious retribution	Harvesters reported superstitions that they could be “swallowed” by the jungle for disobeying orders.
Under constant	

surveillance	
Violence imposed on other workers in front of all workers	Some workers reported that other workers were beaten in front of them.
Withholding of assets (cash or other)	
Withholding of wages	Harvesters were not paid until the end of the harvest season. If in fact they earned money during the harvest season, many harvesters had to wait months (until their lender sold the Brazil-nuts that they harvested) before receiving payment.
Threats against family members (violence or loss of jobs)	Workers reported threats of violence against family members.
Medium indicators of penalty or menace or penalty	
Dismissal	
Exclusion from future employment	Workers interviewed reported exclusion from future employment as a punishment, as well as the use of blacklists.
Exclusion from community and social life	Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for indigenous or peasant communities reported that they could receive punishments, including expulsion from their communities, for failing to harvest a certain amount of Brazil-nuts.
Extra work for breaching discipline	
Financial penalties	
Informing family, community or public	

	about worker's current situation (blackmail)	
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Appendix 11: Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor-Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts

As discussed in the Methodology section, after data collection and analysis was completed using the 2005 ILO indicators “Forced Labor in Practice”, Verité undertook a post-hoc analysis of the research findings with respect to a broader spectrum of indicators of forced labor presented in the ILO’s 2011 publication, *Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children*. A chart of these indicators follows.

		Present
Indicators of unfree recruitment	Strong Indicators of Involuntariness	
	Tradition, birth (birth/descent into 'slave' or bonded status)	There were some isolated reports of workers who were born on <i>haciendas</i> being held in servitude.
	Coercive recruitment (abduction, confinement during the recruitment process)	
	Sale of the worker	
	Recruitment linked to debt (advance or loan)	
	Deception about the nature of the work	
	Medium Indicators of Involuntariness	
	Deceptive recruitment (regarding working conditions, content, or legality of employment)	Some workers reported deception about provision of food, payment, the time it took to carry out tasks, and the provision of land to plant their crops. Some workers also reported deception about promises to give workers land in exchange for back wages owed.

contract, housing and living conditions, legal documentation or acquisition of legal migrant status, job location or employer, wages/earnings)	
Deceptive recruitment through promises of marriage	
Strong Indicators of Menace of Penalty	
Denunciation to authorities	
Confiscation of identity papers or travel documents	
Sexual violence	
Physical violence	
Other forms of punishment	
Removal of rights or privileges (including promotion)	
Religious retribution	
Withholding of assets (cash or other)	

	Threats against family members	
	Medium Indicators of Menace of Penalty	
	Exclusion from future employment	
	Exclusion from community and social life	
	Financial penalties	
	Informing family, community, or public about worker's current situation (blackmail)	

Indicators of work and life under duress	Strong indicators of involuntariness	
	Forced overtime (beyond legal limits)	
	Forced to work on call (day and night)	Some cattle workers reported that they had to be on call day and night during the birthing season.
	Limited freedom of movement and communication	Some workers reported that they were not allowed to leave their workplaces and others reported extreme physical isolation. There was limited access to public or affordable transportation for some workers.
	Degrading living conditions	
	Medium indicators of involuntariness	
	Forced engagement	

	in illegal activities	
	Forced to work for employer's private home or family	
	Induced addiction to illegal substances	
	Induced or inflated indebtedness (by falsification of accounts, inflated prices for goods/services purchased, reduced value of goods/services produced, excessive interest rates on loans, etc.)	<p>Some salaried workers were provided with money, overpriced food and supplies as advances on their wages. Some workers reported that they were never able to earn enough to pay off their debts.</p> <p>Some self-employed workers received cash advances in exchange for a promise to provide money lenders with a certain amount of the milk, cheese, meat, corn, or peanuts at below-market prices.</p>
	Multiple dependency on employer (jobs for relatives, housing, etc.)	Some workers relied on their employers for food and housing.
	Pre-existence of dependency relationship with employer	
	Being under the influence of employer or people related to employer for non-work life.	
	Strong indicators of penalty (or menace of penalty)	

Denunciation to authorities	
Confiscation of identity papers or travel documents	
Confiscation of mobile phones	
Further deterioration in working conditions	
Isolation	Some workers were extremely physically isolated and lacked access to public, regular, or affordable transportation.
Locked in workplace or living quarters	
Sexual violence	Some reports of sexual harassment and abuse were reported on <i>haciendas</i> .
Physical violence	There were reports of fear of violence, threats of violence, and physical abuse
Other forms of punishment (deprivation of food, water, sleep, etc.)	
Violence against worker in front of other worker	
Removal or rights or privileges (including promotion)	
Religious retribution	
Constant surveillance	

Withholding of assets (cash or other)	
Withholding of wages	Some workers were not paid in cash, but rather in food and housing; some workers' payment was withheld until they had paid off their debts; some workers were not paid until they completed a certain task; and some workers were owed back wages for years of unpaid work that continued to go unpaid despite judicial orders.
Threats against family members	
Medium indicators of penalty (or menace of penalty)	
Dismissal	
Exclusion from future employment	
Exclusion from community and social life	Some indigenous workers reported that they could be punished, included by being expelled from their communities, for failing to carry out a designated amount of work on communal lands.
Extra work for breaching labor discipline	
Financial penalties	
Informing family, community or public about worker's current situation (blackmail)	

Indicators of impossibility of leaving employer	Strong indicators of involuntariness	
	Reduced freedom to terminate labor contract after training or other benefit paid by employer	Some indebted workers reported that they felt that they could not leave their jobs before paying off their debts.
	No freedom to resign in accordance with legal requirements	Some indebted workers reported that they felt that they could not leave their jobs before paying off their debts.
	Forced to stay longer than agreed while waiting for wages due	Some workers reported that they were not paid until they completed a certain task.
	Forced to work for indeterminate period to repay outstanding debt or wage advance	Some salaried workers were provided with money, overpriced food and supplies as advances on their wages. Some workers reported that they were never able to earn enough to pay off their debts. Some indebted workers reported that they felt that they could not leave their jobs before paying off their debts.
	Strong indicators of penalty (or menace of penalty)	
	Denunciation to authorities	
	Confiscation of identify paper or travel documents	
	Imposition of worse working conditions	
	Locked in work or living quarters	

Sexual violence	Some reports of sexual harassment and abuse were reported on <i>haciendas</i> .
Physical violence	There were reports of fear of violence, threats of violence, and physical abuse
Other forms of punishment (deprivation of food, water, sleep, etc.)	
Removal of rights or benefits (including promotion)	
Religious retribution	
Under constant surveillance	
Violence imposed on other workers in front of all workers	
Withholding of assets (cash or other)	
Withholding of wages	Some workers were not paid in cash, but rather in food and housing; some workers' payment was withheld until they had paid off their debts; some workers were not paid until they completed a certain task; and some workers were owed back wages for years of unpaid work that continued to go unpaid despite judicial orders.
Threats against family members (violence or loss of jobs)	
Medium indicators of penalty or menace or penalty	

	Dismissal	
	Exclusion from future employment	
	Exclusion from community and social life	Some indigenous workers reported that they could be punished, included by being expelled from their communities, for failing to carry out a designated amount of work on communal lands.
	Extra work for breaching discipline	
	Financial penalties	
	Informing family, community or public about worker's current situation (blackmail)	

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Endnotes

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